A tale of two ports: relational power in COSCO’s European port investments

1. Introduction

Port ownership and management is moving eastward (Noorali et al., Citation 2022) with China a key player (Martin et al., Citation2024; Noorali & Mamadouh, Citation2025). Among a range of mainly Western commentators a pervasive line of analysis of China’s international port investments assumes the overriding logic is geopolitical (e.g., Xie, Citation2021), though concede there are also commercial rationales. This line of analysis forms part of a wider ‘Second Cold War’ geopolitical discourse, which pitches China (and Russia) as potential threats to the Liberal International Order. As Schindler et al. (Citation2024) argue, infrastructure can become sites where such geopolitical tensions materialise wherein China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) functions as an ideational and material container for a multitude of projects (Li & Wang, Citation2025). Infrastructures, thus, become part of what Lin et al. (Citation2019) term rival ‘geopolitical cultures’ which include but go beyond elite narratives and are reflected in a range of spatial policies. In these important but necessarily broad-brush analyses the complexities of actors, interests and investment strategies are typically underplayed. Our analysis develops Oakes (Citation2021) injunction that we need ‘to understand the political effects of China’s development initiatives in a way that does not reduce “the political” to the conventional tropes of state power or geopolitics’ (pp. 281–282). This paper moves beyond these reductive approaches by foregrounding relational processes between multiple actors (Mohan et al., Citation2024; Schaefer & Mohan, Citation2024; Schindler & DiCarlo, Citation2022), but augments these by homing in on the power dynamics inherent within them.

Connectedly this paper addresses the problem of exceptionalism within scholarship on China’s internationalisation (Franceschini & Loubere, Citation2022; Gonzalez-Vicente & Cheng, Citation2025). Positing a ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ begs the question of whether Chinese firms are operating in distinct and exceptional ways. To address this topic, we respond to Blanchard’s (Citation2024a) observation regarding the lack of ‘systematic, comparative analysis’ (p. 2) when analysing Chinese port investments. In parallel to this lack of comparison Jensen (Citation2023, p. 60) bemoans the ‘dearth of in-depth and systematic examination of individual projects that probe the motivations driving Chinese companies’ involvement in overseas seaports, the actual progress of China’s endeavours and the effect flowing from Chinese participation’. A main player in this internationalisation of Chinese port power is the shipping firm COSCO (Blanchard, Citation2024b), and we are interested in comparing how it operates in different European contexts. Here we follow Monios and Wilmsmeier (Citation2015, p. 140) who argue,

when a global port terminal operator replicates the same strategy across a portfolio of geographically distant ports, the result can be different in each case because each port is embedded in its own local and regional territorial and relational hierarchies.

These embedded relations mean that the ‘BRI’s practical implementation depends heavily on the actions of local actors’ (Schneider, Citation2021, p. 13) which requires focusing on the range of political acts and the modalities of power within them.

Our two case studies are the ports of Hamburg in Germany and Piraeus in Greece, sites where COSCO has invested at different rates. While the Hamburg agreement generated controversy in Germany and COSCO’s stake resultingly decreased, the Piraeus deal has progressed, with ambitious plans for further investment. Our questions are: (1) How did COSCO’s investment progress in different European ports? And (2) What does this tell us about the politics of assembling large Chinese-backed infrastructure projects?

Western discourses that treat China’s port investments as geopolitical rests on a view of ‘China’ as a singular entity that projects state power through coordinated investments by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Building on analyses which treat the Chinese state as fragmented (Jones & Hameiri, Citation2021) and the BRI as a contested spatial project (Narins & Agnew, Citation2020) we argue specific port developments are characterised by relational power between a range of state and non-state actors operating at and across different scales, which builds on earlier work around ports as ‘spatial fixes’ for an inherently mobile capital (Wilmsmeier & Monios, Citation2015). In developing our framework for understanding relational power in COSCO’s European port investments we first engage with recent scholarship that centres the geopolitical motivations for such investment before examining recent contributions on political-economic ‘variegation’. From there we review approaches to power in China’s international engagements and use the work of geographer John Allen (Citation2003) to theorise relational power in the deployment of infrastructure projects. Next, we lay out our case selection and methodology before analysing the two cases and finishing with a discussion that argues that state authority proved decisive in determining the trajectory of these investments by the same firm.

2. Framing: from state-centred geopolitical power to relational power

2.1. Beyond securitisation

While most recent analyses posit that both geopolitical and economic imperatives come together in China’s overseas port investments (Blanchard, Citation2024a), many frame new port investments as geopolitical, which manifests as a series of fears (Noorali & Mamadouh, Citation2025). For example, the European Parliament argued that ‘gaining access to foreign  …  ports  …  .is also a critical geostrategic asset’ (Grieger cited in Blanchard, Citation2024a, p. 3). Iftikhar and Zhan (Citation2022, p. 827) noted that ‘overseas port investments constitute an important geopolitical strategy’ while an influential piece argued that the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s ‘use of commercial ports for military logistics and intelligence functions … constitutes an underappreciated but consequential form of state power projection’ (Kardon & Leutert, Citation2022, p. 10). Most recently Ziemer et al. (Citation2025) asserted that ‘(W)hile these [port] investments bring commercial opportunity, they also open the door for Beijing to gain strategic leverage, collect sensitive data, and expand its geopolitical influence closer to U.S. shores’. Some analyses, like Kardon and Leutert (Citation2022) hedge their bets by stressing the ‘dual use’ capability of ports wherein mercantilist interests may dominate, but facilities could be switched for military purposes though Blanchard (Citation2024a) notes that this argument is usually asserted rather than demonstrated. These framings generate a sense in which Chinese state power is projected externally as part of a coordinated strategy, notably the Maritime Silk Road Initiative as part of the wider BRI (van der Putten, Citation2019).

2.2. Towards variegation

Picking up from Oakes’ argument cited above, over the past few years analyses of China’s international infrastructure push have emerged which seek to move beyond these state-centric security logics (e.g., Cheng & Apostolopoulou, Citation2023; Mayer & Zhang, Citation2021). These studies argue that Chinese-backed infrastructure projects are multi-scalar and multi-actor which produces more indeterminate outcomes than a singular focus on securitisation. Emblematic of this is Schindler and DiCarlo’s (Citation2022) focus on ‘how great power rivalry not only shapes but is shaped by lived experience that extends beyond geopolitical rhetoric and hegemonic agendas’ (p. 643). This shaping and being shaped speaks to the relationality which concerns us.

While we do not deny that geopolitical considerations are evident in China’s outward investments in ports and other major infrastructure (Lin et al., Citation2019), we follow two converging lines of argument which situate ports and Chinese-backed infrastructure as part of a dynamic capitalist system. Wilmsmeier and Monios (Citation2015) argued that ports represent both a ‘spatial fix’ for capitalism and require ‘scalar fixes’ as states and private actors cooperate in new configurations to capture trade and investment. Situating ports as critical nodes in global capitalist networks echoes work on Global China as Method (GCasM) (Lee, Citation2022), which argues that the idea of a coordinated strategy on the part of China is premised on essentialism; that Chinese actors fall under a single system and that this is inherently ‘other’ to the Liberal International Order. By contrast GCasM is profoundly relational in that ‘China is not an alternative to but rather an integral part of a global system that today works according to capitalist dynamics’ (Franceschini & Loubere, Citation2022, p. 6; Reboredo & Gambino, Citation2023). A defining feature of China’s internationalisation is its use of infrastructure (Strange, Citation2024) to build connectivity and cement political relations, aimed at achieving ‘network centrality’ (Schindler et al., Citation2024). The competing hegemony of the so-called Second Cold War is less about building exclusive ‘spheres of influence’ as in the ‘First Cold War’ and more about controlling logistical, technological and regulatory networks.

In terms of the variegation of Chinese capital, Lee (Citation2017) argues Chinese firms can pursue ‘encompassing accumulation’ which combines state and capital logics. This is echoed by Liu et al. (Citation2020) who argue central SOEs can invest in ports for geostrategic reasons, which may yield longer term benefits whereas provincial SOEs are more commercial and see port investment in terms of immediate profitability. In his study of the port of Valencia, Jensen (Citation2023) argued there are both commercial and expansionary dynamics at play, which are interconnected but operate over different timescales. As such, he reveals state capitalism(s) in relation; that is, outbound Chinese state capitalists (such as COSCO) interface with host country state capitalists, given that host local governments often back port development.

Another important strand of this critical literature on port infrastructures is around political responses, which produce variegated outcomes on the ground. Although not explicitly focused on Chinese port investment, Hönke and Cuesta-Fernandez (Citation2018) used the idea of ‘controversies’ to interrogate how stakeholders seek to shape port investments to realise their interests, with controversies combining material and discursive aspects. Another strand is Apostolopoulou’s (Citation2024) urban justice angle around the social consequences and ecological impacts of port investment. We build on these more nuanced studies of Chinese infrastructure by focusing on the contested and multi-scalar processes of assembling port projects, but also how Chinese actors respond and adapt to them (Li & Wang, Citation2025).

2.3. Relational power and beyond

The preceding section highlighted the importance of state power in enabling port investments, but intimated that power is not solely held by states. The more geostrategic readings of Chinese port investment assume a centredness of the Chinese state and an unproblematic external projection. Such views of power see it ‘as something which radiates out from an identifiable central point, with a reach that appears almost effortless’ (Allen, Citation2004, p. 19). Here we agree with Goh (Citation2014) that power, Chinese or otherwise, is a latent capability whereas influence is a concrete outcome. This distinction is important insofar as much commentary on Chinese overseas investment assumes that China can coerce other states into doing something they would otherwise not do. Rather, as Goh (Citation2014) argued, we need to analyse ‘actual influence’ which is both a relational and empirical question.

Here we briefly discuss three recent interpretations of China’s (relational) power projection which provide insights for our study. First, Lee (Citation2022, p. 317) argued ‘Power is relational, so we should attend to resistance, bargaining, accommodation, appropriation and adaptations by players in this power project’. Rather than focus on discrete policies and programmes, Lee proposes a three-prong power mechanism to investigate China’s outward expansion: (1) economic statecraft: the deployment of economic means to achieve political or foreign policy ends, (2) patron-clientelism: unequal relationships replete with dependency and loyalty amongst actors external to the Chinese state and (3) symbolic domination: the (re)production of power through symbolism. Lee’s classification usefully focuses on the mechanisms for exercising power, and sees power as relational and contested, which usefully tempers one-sided accounts of Chinese domination. However, she does not explicitly theorise power.

In terms of theorising Chinese power Ho (Citation2020) examined China’s infrastructural presence in Southeast Asia. She sees infrastructure as combining structural power and, echoing Lee, discursive power. The former is understood as ‘domination’ based on asymmetric relations between states, but she augments this is by seeing domestic society as also shaped by these relationships such that ‘a dominant state can non-intentionally and indirectly dominate and penetrate the society of a subordinate state as a result of infrastructure projects’ (p. 1471). The use of discourses is linked to development (Appel et al., Citation2018) as China and the states it engages with narrate a hopeful future of benefit capture from infrastructure (Noorali & Mamadouh, Citation2025). Ho argues many countries in the Global South internalise the structural asymmetry with China but seek some benefits that would not accrue if they were to reject China outright. In Europe such asymmetry is less marked, and we will see presently how domestic power dynamics play into the unfolding of port projects. Ho usefully foregrounds the unevenness of power, sees infrastructures as one medium through which power is exercised, moves beyond state-to-state accounts, and sees discourses as a form of power. However, in contrast to Lee, Ho’s focus on domination risks repeating realist claims that China unproblematically influences other states.

Eisenman (Citation2023) examined the idea of relationality in China’s power in Africa, drawing on the Chinese social theorist Qin Yaqing. The author (p. 2443) sees Qin’s concept of ‘relationality’ as a Chinese version of ‘social capital’ which ‘envisions a web of interactive dyadic partnerships within which both sides become more powerful by sharing their resources with each other’. Yet the underlying assumption is while each actor gains power through the relationship ultimately the outcome is to ‘conform to one’s will during the process of social interaction’ (Qin, Citation2016, p. 42 in Eisenman, Citation2023, p. 2444). This recognises the asymmetry of power and intentionality even as the outcomes potentially empower both parties. Eisenman proceeds by analysing how China’s International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC) proliferates its networks in Africa to leverage power. However, while the relational dimensions are useful and require us to examine the micro-level of institutions, they come somewhat at the expense of power sources and mechanisms that operate outside of the actor-centred dyad; notably the structural and discursive power that Ho discusses.

Taken together these analyses of China’s internationalisation provide valuable framings of power as relational and actor-centred, discursive and based on domination which is tempered by interactional contestation with actors – primarily but not exclusively state-based elites – outside China. From these analyses we start examining relational power. Fundamentally, relational power concerns influence actors exert through their relationships with one another. It is rooted in (re)sources or, as Allen (Citation2004, p. 20) writes, ‘dispositions’. Instead of seeing dispositions – whether materialities or capabilities – as equivalent to having power, we should focus on the operation of power and its causal effects (Azmanova, Citation2018).

Rather than being dyadic, as Eisenman discusses (Citation2023), Allen emphatically argues against an endlessly decentred view of power; power may be centred in institutions but only becomes consequential (or not) through ‘power’s mediated relationality’ (Allen, Citation2004, p. 25). To examine how power works in the world we use Allen’s (Citation2003, p. 2) differentiation between a series of modalities of power that include authority, coercion, domination, persuasion, seduction and manipulation: (1) Authority relies on legitimacy and its acceptance over time. Compliance is achieved through consent and is a modality mainly associated with the operation of large bureaucratic organisations, especially states, that can create, modify and enforce legal frameworks. (State) authority is often challenged, and where it is not recognised, other modalities of power are used. (2) Coercion relies on the threat of using force to secure compliance while (3) domination depends on the application of force to secure compliance. Allen differentiates between various (but related) ‘quieter registers’ of power that do not seek to change behaviour through compulsion. (4) Persuasion involves negotiations trying to induce actors through offering some sort of compensation (e.g., employment opportunities, or other benefits like infrastructure) aimed at pacifying opposition. (5) Seduction involves the promotion of visions of the future, which are beneficial for other actors, in the attempt to align their interests with those of the state/company implementing a project. (6) Manipulation involves acts of deception, dishonesty, false promises, broken arrangements, or unmet expectations.

These modalities are analytically distinct and ‘constituted differently in space and time’ (Allen, Citation2003, p. 3, emphasis in original), but in practice may overlap. Modalities that provide ‘power over’ require presence and proximity to be effective, while quieter modalities are not dependent on proximity, but are thus more easily ignored or subverted. This provides a repertoire of different tactics of power that are employed by social actors. While Allen (Citation2003) argues that quieter registers of power rely less on presence and proximity, in practice the tactics involved in them lead companies to become more embedded and influential (Frederiksen & Himley, Citation2020).

3. Methodology

The data for this paper is drawn from the Reorienting Development: The Dynamics and Effects of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe (REDEFINE) project that covers a range of infrastructure types across four European countries – Germany, Greece, Hungary and the UK. REDEFINE’s aim is to understand the processes of assembling such projects and so case studies were selected which represented different motivations of the Chinese actors, the specificities of infrastructure (e.g., brownfield/greenfield), sectors (e.g., energy, transport, urban regeneration) and the variegated political-economies of European host states. When Chinese firms stepped up their investment into Europe from around 2011, the reception was broadly positive (e.g., Turcsanyi & Kachlikova, Citation2020) which was bolstered in 2013 by the launch of the BRI. In some countries, and at the EU level, the tide began to change against China from around 2017 with the EU labelling it as a ‘strategic rival’ (EC, Citation2019). Rogelja and Tsimonis (Citation2020) argued we need ‘a pluralistic and fact-based debate on Chinese investment and financing in Europe’ (p. 105) and suggested that project-focused case studies are the best way to do this. However, single project case studies not only run the risk of reifying an essential ‘Chinese-ness’ but fail to do what our comparison does of examining how the investment strategies of the same Chinese firm are shaped by the local dynamics it encounters.

3.1. Case selection

In this article, we address COSCO’s investment in Piraeus and Hamburg. Piraeus serves as a ‘dragon’s head’ (Xi, Citation2019) linking to a transport corridor through the Balkans and Eastern Europe, while Hamburg, one of Northern Europe’s most important ports, has staked its future on logistical connectivity amid recent lacklustre performance (Bersick, Citation2024). Germany represents Europe’s economic ‘core’ while Greece occupies a more ‘peripheral’ position and has strained relations with the EU following the country’s sovereign debt crisis. Notably the troika, comprising the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF, imposed stringent conditions on their loans to Greece, which required privatisation and retrenchment. Importantly, COSCO achieved full operational control over the whole Piraeus port, unique among its European investments, while holding only partial equity in one terminal at Hamburg (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation2020). Comparing these contrasting outcomes allows us to understand how COSCO’s different investments in two European ports play out given its embeddedness in multiple territorial configurations.

Established in 1961, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) began operating under the official name of COSCO SHIPPING in 2016 after merging with China Shipping (Group) Company. As a Central Government-controlled enterprise, the Chinese state impacts on COSCO through human resource management, the embedding of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) branches, and various subsidies and preferential policies. For instance, COSCO’s senior management team, particularly the Party secretary and the CEO, are handpicked by the CCP’s Organisation Department as well as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (Ma & Peverelli, Citation2019). As a result, its expansion aims at advancing China’s goals of internationalisation and modernisation (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation2015/Citation16). In this context, COSCO actively ‘assume[s] the responsibility of the national platform for practising the Belt and Road Initiative’ (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation2020, p. 58), helping realise China’s ambition of becoming a ‘sea power’ and ‘shipping power’ (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation2021, p. 4).

COSCO’s growth strategy is particularly evident in its European investments. Zheng and Smith (Citation2019) suggest COSCO’s European presence in the 1980s was very limited and concentrated in shipping. From the late 1990s onwards, it began investing in transport, logistics and port operation as part of China’s ‘Go Global’ strategy (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation n.d.). This strategy intensified in the 2000s and continued into the 2010s and 2020s, with large-scale investments from the state (Noorali & Mamadouh, Citation2025) and a preference for obtaining controlling stakes in foreign ports of strategic significance (Yang et al., Citation2020). COSCO’s European investments form part of its global portfolio of 58 terminals worldwide which, as of December 2024, included 51 container terminals (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation n.d.). Globally, COSCO accounts for about 75% of the total TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) handled by Chinese terminal operators, dwarfing the second-placed CMP Holdings’ 10% share (MERICS, Citation2023). Simultaneously, COSCO advanced its inter-modal strategy, with shipping and port management nodes becoming parts of logistical networks (COSCO SHIPPING, Citation2020, Citation2021).

Throughout this article, COSCO refers to COSCO SHIPPING unless otherwise specified. Several subsidiaries are relevant to our case studies: COSCO SHIPPING Hong Kong (formerly COSCO Hong Kong) is a wholly-owned shipping-related investment company of COSCO SHIPPING, while COSCO SHIPPING Ports (CSP, previously known as COSCO Pacific) is a port/terminal operator, 66.13% owned by COSCO SHIPPING Holdings which is in turn 43.62% owned by COSCO SHIPPING.

3.2. Comparative process tracing methodology

In structuring our comparison, we used process tracing (PT), which entails unpacking procedures and principles undertaken to reconstruct the course of action taken along the project life cycle (Bennett & Checkel, Citation2014). This approach requires prolonged engagement with various stakeholders in collecting large amounts of mainly qualitative data on the case under reconstruction. In general PT tends to be used for within case explanations though it can be used for comparison between cases (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, Citation2017). PT is also sensitive to context because causes and outcomes may play out differently, so we need to understand the context to judge whether a cause generated the outcome. Here the materiality of infrastructure projects is key – this can be the localities where they sit in terms of geology, proximity to cities, etc. as well as the type of infrastructure (e.g., subterranean, offshore, etc.) and whether they are brownfield or greenfield investments.

Across each case, we ask:

1. Who are the key actors in each Chinese-backed port assemblage and what roles do they play with respect to the project? Actors include individuals, corporations, organisations, governments and material entities that are involved in infrastructure investment.

2. How do these actors relate to one another and what relational dynamics are at play? Relational dynamics covers the nature of the relationship (e.g., contractually, as citizens, as different levels of a government structure, etc.) and Allen’s power modalities.

3. What are the possible reasons behind these relational dynamics?

4. What manifestations do we see in terms port infrastructure deployment?

Our analysis is based on a mixed-method approach combining desk research, interviews and participant observation. We conducted 31 and 19 semi-structured interviews between 2023 and 2024 in the Piraeus and Hamburg cases, respectively. The interviews were conducted primarily in Greek and German, with some in English owing to the involvement of other interviewers from our team. Our interviewees were selected through purposive sampling (derived from our desk research) and snowballing to capture diverse perspectives across both cases. They included academics and experts, community activists, central and local government officials, port employees, union representatives and legal advisors involved in the privatisation process. Some interviewees held multiple roles (e.g., port employees who were also union members), providing insights from different organisational positions. Some interviews incorporated cross-case discussions, with interviewees being asked to compare both ports; for instance, where consultants from Hamburg Port worked on the Piraeus tender. Interview numbering follows a three-digit format for anonymisation purposes with the first digit indicating which country the case represents.

These primary data are supplemented by documentary analysis of corporate annual reports, EU and national policy documents, and media interviews with COSCO executives largely because none of them responded to our interview requests. We also conducted limited participant observations of town-hall meetings and scoping visits to port facilities to contextualise our cases and gain first-hand impressions of the port projects. Data collection complied with ethical protocols and was approved by The Open University’s Human Research Ethics Committee (ref: HREC/3556/Mohan).

We present each case in turn for two linked reasons. First, our PT approach is based on causality which tends to be temporally sequential so the narrative for each case traces the periods from the projects’ inception through to the latest significant development – the agreement to a reduced investment in Hamburg and the master plan’s approval in Piraeus. Second, while our analytical focus is relational power, we decided against taking each of Allen’s modalities in turn which would disrupt each case’s causal narrative. Moreover, the modalities of power are not equally present in each case, so we highlight the most important power modality(ies) operating at key junctures. In the conclusion, we draw out comparisons across cases.

4. Piraeus

COSCO’s investment in Piraeus unfolded in two phases. In 2008 COSCO Pacific secured a 35-year concession from the Greek state-owned Piraeus Port Authority (PPA) to upgrade and operate Pier II while constructing and operating Pier III of the container terminal. Subsequently, COSCO Hong Kong transitioned to the majority ownership of the PPA itself, acquiring 51% in 2016 and raising its stake to 67% in 2021.

4.1. Elite networks and state-business relations

In 1999, the Greek government initiated the port reform of ‘corporatisation’ (Law Citation2688/Citation1999) and re-structured ports into state-controlled (75% share) ‘public law undertakings’ (Psaraftis & Pallis, Citation2012, p. 29). To increase the competitiveness of Piraeus, classified as one of two Greek ports of ‘international interest’ (Psaraftis & Pallis, Citation2012, p. 27), the Greek government started the privatisation of the container terminal in 2006. Port privatisation was a common practice in the industry (Yang et al., Citation2020), but in this case, it was also part of the Greek conservative government’s broader efforts to reform and restructure the national economy (Stroikos, Citation2023). This power was rooted in the state’s authority to govern, though the pressure to privatise from the troika was a form of transnational authority rooted in the structures of the EU but backed up by coercion in the sense of penalties for non-compliance. While these state-level decisions created an institutional framework for privatisation, COSCO’s involvement emerged through transnational business-state networks.

The 2008 deal was, according to several interviewees (Interviews 410, 420, 431), instigated by Vassilis Constantakopoulos, founder of Costamare Shipping, who not only ‘initiated the contacts with the Chinese government’ (Interview 412) but also persuaded the Greek government to invite Chinese investment into Piraeus. His advocacy was motivated by his ‘special relationship with China’ – established through building ships there with Chinese financing – and by his need for docking infrastructure in Piraeus that could accommodate his larger vessels (Interviews 410, 430, 431). This exemplifies how state-business relations operate through persuasion, wherein shipping industry leaders leverage their economic importance and global networks to influence policy directions, particularly when their business interests align with (or exploit) broader economic priorities (Interviews 410, 430). Such dynamics were further entrenched during the 2006 Greek state visit to China, where initial discussions about privatising the container terminal involved then-Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, shipowners and COSCO’s then-CEO Wei Jiafu (Interview 412). These meetings established connections that would shape subsequent developments.

On the Chinese side, COSCO Pacific (Citation2006, p. 1) saw ports as ‘the principal earnings driver’, seeking ‘majority stakes’ to ‘maximis[e] enterprise value on the basis of controlling rights’. For Wei, Greece represented more than a business opportunity as Glass (Citation2013) noted that he had become ‘something of a champion for Greece’ and developed ‘a close relationship with several shipping people, especially the late Vassilis Constantakopoulos’. Thus, soon after the 2006 meeting with Karamanlis in Beijing, Wei, together with the Chinese ambassador to Greece, met him again in Athens where they solidified the partnership by christening COSCO HELLAS, chartered from Costamare (Chinese Embassy to Greece, Citation2006). According to Gontika (Citation2022, p. 78), on a different occasion, Wei allegedly asked Karamanlis ‘to keep up his end of the deal as China had’, which could be interpreted as a coercive move and highlights ongoing state support for corporate activities.

4.2. Contesting and reshaping privatisation

The 2008 concession agreement immediately encountered resistance from local governments and unions that reshaped its implementation. For instance, strikes by dockworkers shut down the container terminal for two months and, more importantly, forced COSCO and the PPA to renegotiate part of the concession (Gontika, Citation2022; Psaraftis & Pallis, Citation2012). The years of negotiated resistance, such as fighting for safety protocols and collective agreements, compromised the unilateral authority from COSCO and elements of the Greek state. Despite lacking the formal authority of state actors or corporate resources, workers leveraged their local knowledge within port operations to assert influence, delaying COSCO’s plans and securing some benefits.

While dockworkers contested the concession, COSCO proceeded with its contractual obligations by upgrading existing quays, installing cranes and constructing Pier III (PCT, Citation2010). Simultaneously, COSCO imposed a new operating system, CATOS, that a specialist with firsthand experience (Interview 431) criticised as ‘less advanced than [its predecessor] NAVIS’. These changes consolidated COSCO’s authority over and beyond the port space. By 2024, Piraeus had become the eastern Mediterranean’s largest port and the EU’s fifth-busiest container terminal, with container throughput surging 284.7% since 2007 (PortEconomics, Citation2025). Meanwhile, COSCO’s investment also attracted major companies such as HP to establish Greek distribution centres, with Huawei announcing similar plans in 2013 that finally materialised in 2024, thus embedding Piraeus into global supply chains (Ekathimerini, Citation2024; van der Putten, Citation2014).

By 2014, news of privatising the entire Piraeus port began to circulate. The troika’s bailout agreement mandated the privatisation of state assets to meet specific revenue requirements without specifying which assets to sell. In this context, PPA representatives attempted, according to an insider (Interview 431), to persuade the Greek government into steering Chinese investors toward investing in Greek railways rather than full port privatisation. They argued that Piraeus ‘was on the end of the fifth [Trans-European Transport Network] corridor with less developed and more unfinished parts … mainly on the railway’ and that the Chinese ‘don’t need the other parts of the port’ (Interview 431). However, their position was disregarded as then-deputy Prime Minister Dragasakis returned from China with a commitment to privatise the whole port, contrary to PPA’s advice (Interview 431). When questioned, Dragasakis blamed the interpreter present in the meeting before ceasing communication with PPA entirely (Interview 431), which smacks of manipulating the events.

There was a broad opposition to the privatisation which included the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and local municipalities. Even the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund was hesitant to privatise the port at the beginning, acknowledging that ‘the priority of the time is to monetise assets as fast as possible’ and port privatisation ‘was not a quick monetisation’ due to lengthy tender processes (Interview 404). Nevertheless, due to the pressures from both the Chinese and the troika, the Greek state ‘proceed[ed] with this project in 2015 summer, after [it] signed the third memorandum [with the troika]’ (Interview 431), and COSCO Hong Kong emerged as the sole bidder in 2016. As one lawyer involved in the privatisation explained, ‘[t]he general objective was of course to generate income for the Greek state’ (Interview 403). These contestations demonstrate how different power relations have shaped the process, with the troika’s political and economic coercion ultimately overriding both local expert knowledge and some national authorities.

4.3. Negotiating visions: COSCO’s master plan and its opponents

To fulfil its €293.7 million investment commitment (2016–2021) from the 2016 acquisition of PPA’s majority stake, COSCO proposed 11 projects, including a cruise-ship terminal, logistics centre, hotels and a shopping mall (GTP, Citation2019a). This is known as COSCO’s master plan aimed at transforming Piraeus port into ‘a home porting hub and the largest shipbuilding base in the eastern Mediterranean’ (GTP, Citation2019a). More than a technical document, this master plan emerged as a contested arena where diverse stakeholders engaged in complex power dynamics. Within this context, various modalities of power – seduction, authority and coercion – converged and competed across different scales.

First, COSCO deployed seduction by promoting the vision of future prosperity to align the interests of Greek central and local governments, local businesses and public with its agenda. For instance, COSCO-PPA chairman Yu (Citation2021) stated that his goal was for Piraeus ‘to become the largest and most efficient logistic hub in Central and Eastern Europe’ while emphasising that COSCO’s investment ‘has offered more than 3000 direct jobs to the local community and more than 10,000 jobs in related services, contributing €1.4 billion in taxes, duties and social security contributions’. Such economic promises were complemented by appeals to Greek national pride, with Yu (Citation2021) emphasising his commitment to expanding ‘Piraeus port into the biggest harbour in Europe and one of the most important ports in the world’. This seduction masked, however, COSCO’s effort to strengthen its authority in redefining the future of the port as local input was largely excluded from the plan’s iteration. As a local mayor (Interview 427) told us, ‘We do not have access to COSCO’. Arguably this is a form of manipulation given that local concerns were actively sidelined, underscoring that authority worked in tandem with quieter registers of power to advance COSCO’s vision.

Second, this seductive vision encountered resistance. COSCO’s master plan, submitted in several versions, was repeatedly challenged by national and local actors who sought to persuade them of alternatives on technical and environmental grounds. For instance, its proposed car terminal expansion was scrapped after pressure from a local shipyard union (Interview 413). Instead, COSCO introduced a vertical storage system which our interviewee explained can save space (Interview 413) and was hailed as a hard-won victory. Local governments also mobilised to have public consultations on the proposed development and its environmental consequences, but their impact was restricted by the privatisation law that prevented them from stopping any pre-approved projects. At the national level, despite pressure from the Chinese Embassy in Athens, the Syriza government insisted on COSCO complying with environmental legal frameworks. And the Central Archaeological Council also designated much of Piraeus as archaeologically important, which means it would be impossible to do any construction, thus delaying the port upgrade (Interview 410; GTP, Citation2019b). Together, these actions stalled COSCO’s master plan for several years, making it a focal point for competing interests, even as Piraeus was repositioned in global logistics systems.

4.4. Repositioning and growing geopolitical tensions

In January 2023, COSCO’s master plan was approved by the Greek Shipping Ministry after Greek President Sakellaropoulou issued a presidential decree that included ‘special spatial planning and environmental protection terms’ (Paravantes, Citation2023). As Greek Shipping Minister Yiannis Plakiotakis argued, the procedure of approving COSCO’s master plan ‘paves the way for the country’s ports to take a step forward … .that will ensure a future for the benefit of both local communities and the national economy’ (quoted from Paravantes, Citation2023). The modified plan reflects how prolonged contestation resulted in a negotiated compromise rather than unilateral authority, illustrating the recursive relationship among authority, persuasion and seduction in shaping infrastructure process and outcomes. This resolution allowed Piraeus to be further integrated into global logistics networks. For instance, Piraeus port increasingly became linked to the BRI, as the ‘dragon’s head’, with potential onward links, such as the Pan-European Corridor X and the Hungarian-Serbia railway, through the Balkans and into Western Europe. Another recent development is the initiation of the China-Europe Sea-Land Express, an intermodal transport service, connecting the Far East, the Balkans and Central Europe via ocean and rail transport (Papatolios, Citation2021). Our interviewees (410, 429) suggest, however, that both the Greek state and COSCO now hold more modest expectations than during the 2008 concession, reflecting the complex realities of implementing such ambitious integration.

Importantly, this process continues to be contested through various forms of relational power. Most significantly, the logistical pivoting of Piraeus has attracted attention from regional and global powers, introducing new geopolitical dimensions to apparently local or national infrastructure politics. According to our Greek interviewees (413), ‘[p]eople from the American embassy were here [Piraeus] every day’ engaging in what they described as efforts to ‘stop the Chinese investments’ which Americans feared would weaken their power in relation to China. In 2020, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (Citation2020) warned of potential national security implications of Chinese investments in Europe, claiming that China was ‘flagrantly attacking European sovereignty by buying up ports and critical infrastructure, Piraeus to Valencia’. This represents a form of persuasion by reframing investment as a security threat, and appealing to sovereignty concerns rather than economic calculations. This intervention reveals how infrastructure can trigger new exercises of relational power as competing global actors attempt to influence the trajectory of strategic nodes within global networks.

5. Hamburg

The port of Hamburg is managed by Hamburg Port Authority (HPA), which is a public entity owned by the City of Hamburg. Its four container terminals are managed by the container terminal operators Eurogate, operating Eurogate Container Terminal Hamburg (CTH), and Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA). HHLA is a shareholder company that was listed in 2007 and as of September 2024 (HHLA, Citation2025) remained in public hands, with its major shareholder being the City of Hamburg (66.8%), followed by Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) with a 23.4% stake. HHLA operates (i) Container Terminal Altenwerder (CTA), in which Hapag-Lloyd is involved with 25.1% of the shares; (ii) Container Terminal Burchardkai (CTB) that is fully owned by HHLA; and (iii) Container Terminal Tollerort (CTT), owned by HHLA, in which COSCO SHIPPING Ports (CSP) became a minority shareholder in 2023 after a period of conflict within the German federal government regarding the geopolitical and economic ramifications of the investment.

5.1. Port competition for the Chinese market

Hamburg is the third busiest container port in Europe after Rotterdam and Antwerp-Bruges in terms of TEU throughput (World Shipping Council, Citation2025); 30% of its total seaborne container throughput is with China, four times more than with the USA (HHLA, Citation2023), highlighting the port’s dependency on its major trade partner. In recent decades, CSP invested heavily in Northern European ports, acquiring shares in container terminals at Hamburg’s two main competitors: In 2004, COSCO Pacific (now CSP) secured a 20% share in Antwerp Gateway. In 2014, CSP acquired a 24% stake in Zeebrugge container terminal (now called CSP Zeebrugge Terminal), which it increased to 85.45% in 2017, with a managing concession for the terminal until 2055. Finally, CSP acquired a 35% stake at the ECT Euromax Terminal in Rotterdam in 2016. Footnote1

Given the competition for the docking of large vessels and stagnating handling volumes compared to its competitors (HHLA, Citation2025), a major infrastructural project was undertaken to deepen and widen the navigable channel (fairway) for ships, allowing the port to handle the largest container ships irrespective of the tide (Hein & Thomsen, Citation2023). The fairway adaptation led to a decade-long conflict between various stakeholders, with the German Administrative Court using its authority to override objections by environmentalists and riverine municipalities. Dredging started in 2019, and the project was completed in early 2022 (Hein & Thomsen, Citation2023). Further reacting to the intense competition with Rotterdam and Antwerp-Bruges given their proximity and similar catchment areas, HHLA attempted to bind COSCO to the location, with the goal to strengthen the port’s position as a logistics hub to boost its growth (Interviews 255, 256, 265). In the past HHLA had resisted attempts by shipping companies to buy into its container terminals due to its authority as one of the major container ports in Northern Europe, backed by the German state. For instance, in 2010 Wei Jiafu sought to persuade the then mayor of Hamburg Christoph Ahlhaus (CDU) in a visit to the city hall to release a stake to COSCO, but to no avail (Kopp, Citation2018).

As HHLA’s main competitors jumped on the bandwagon of private involvement in container terminals, and given market stagnation and the restructuring of the sector due to the growing power of shipping companies and their alliances, Hamburg was coerced to change its strategy to regain its competitiveness. In this context, a mutually beneficial agreement was sought with COSCO, with both sides deploying seduction and persuasion. HHLA leveraged its relations with COSCO, which has been a shipping customer at CTT since 1982 (Interview 260), while the bulk of the terminal’s container throughput is with the Chinese SOE – in 2021 it was 65% (Bersick, Citation2024). At the same time, COSCO aimed to expand its competitive power relative to other containerised shipping services, by investing in all five major European container ports (Antwerp-Bruges, Piraeus, Rotterdam and Valencia being the other four). The Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan visited CTT in June 2019 (HHLA, Citation2019), indicating China’s interest in the terminal. No bidding process took place for the acquisition of shares in CTT (Interviews 254, 255) and CSP made an offer for 49% of the operating company of CTT in 2020 (Interview 255). In June 2021 HHLA (Citation2021a) announced its negotiations with CSP about the acquisition of a minority stake in CTT and on 21 September 2021 declared that negotiations had been successfully concluded for the acquisition of 35% of the shares (HHLA, Citation2021b).

5.2. State interventions for and against the deal amidst de-risking

The deal at CTT moved into the media spotlight in 2022, with fear expressed about Chinese influence over strategic infrastructure. Simultaneously, the deal was intensely debated in the German federal parliament and within the German state government coalition that had formed in December 2021, consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

In a display of persuasive and manipulative discursive power, exaggerated and incorrect claims were made in the press about the supposed sell-off of Hamburg’s port to China, leading to an emotive public discussion (Interviews 253, 256). This is attributed to changed perceptions within Germany regarding dependence on foreign powers, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which led to calls for de-risking within the country and the EU (Interviews 262, 263). These shifts in national level politics are reflected in the different stances adopted within the federal government coalition; the smaller coalition partners (Greens and FDP) through the ministries they headed positioned themselves against the deal, while the SPD and the Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a former mayor of Hamburg, backed it.

Proponents of the investment, including the Mayor of Hamburg, Peter Tschentscher (SPD) and the Government of Hamburg, deployed seduction by foregrounding the expansion of collaboration with business partners in China, the securing of jobs, and the overall benefits for the city, the port and the economy (Bersick, Citation2024, Interview 255). Such positions were shared by the oppositional parties in the city-state of Hamburg. A representative of the Greens in Hamburg argued that ‘as a Green from Hamburg or as a government representative from Hamburg, in comparison to the debate that the Greens in the federal level led, have decoupled very much. So, this is a lot about political symbolism’ (Interview 253). Opposition at the EU, federal and local levels focused on the influence that China would exert on German infrastructure, on dependencies that would be created with regards to supply chains, and on the sovereignty of ports amidst the increasing power of major shipping companies (Interviews 254, 263, 264; Ghiretti et al., Citation2023). Trade unions at the port also opposed the deal, mentioning increased precarity of working conditions at the Port of Piraeus after COSCO’s investment there, although trade unionists argued that a minority involvement of a shipping company could not by itself transform the labour regime (Interviews 259, 260, 261). In this conjuncture, the Greens and FDP attempted to use their authority as federal government coalition partners to block the investment. In August 2022, the Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, Robert Habeck (Greens), announced that he would veto the deal, stating concerns about the growing dependence on China. In this respect, investment review procedures were undertaken with regards to the Foreign Trade Act. Other federal government ministers, such as the Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens) and the Minister of Finance Christian Lindner (FDP) strongly criticised the deal, which was also opposed by CDU, the main opposition party.

5.3. Towards a compromise

Given the divisions within the federal government, with the Chancellery favouring the deal, alignment was sought with a partial prohibition of the investment. Here contestation resulted in a negotiated compromise rather than unilateral authority, illustrating the relationship between authority and resistance in shaping infrastructure processes and outcomes. On 26 October 2022 the German federal government allowed CSP to take a stake below 25% instead of the planned 35% (HHLA, Citation2022). This agreement was pushed through by Chancellor Scholz with the support of SPD-led ministries, in a demonstration of power within the coalition government for the economic interests of HHLA and the City of Hamburg, despite protests by the coalition partners. Twenty-five per cent is the limit for a blocking minority in the operation of a company, and the reduced participation of CSP would make it effectively unable to directly influence decisions regarding Tollerort. While the reduction in CSP’s share was a concession towards the coalition partners’ concerns, the Ministry for Economic Affairs (BMWK) insisted that the ‘reason for the partial prohibition is the existence of a threat to public order and safety’ (BMWK, Citation2022) and in early 2023, the German Federal Office for Information Security, classified CTT as critical infrastructure. This led to a review of the previous governmental decision to allow the deal with a lower participation by CSP. In June 2023, HHLA announced that, following the completion of the investment screening process, the agreement was signed (HHLA, Citation2023). Finally, in November 2023 the German federal government reached a compromise and officially approved the deal, capping COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ involvement in CTT at 24.9%.

Dependence on China was used both as a persuasive argument for and against CSP’s investment at Tollerort (Godehardt, Citation2024). Proponents focused on the potential benefits for the port of Hamburg in its competition with other Northern European ports for market dominance and close ties with China. By contrast, critics presented the investment as a security threat stating the increased influence of China on strategic infrastructure with the possibility of disrupting supply chains. But ultimately, the potential risks were not perceived great enough to fully cancel the deal, reflecting the relational power within the German federal government coalition.

CSP’s investment continues to be complicated by the more recent agreement between HHLA and another major shipping company, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), for the acquisition of 49.9% of shares in HHLA itself (MSC, Citation2024). Here, discussions about sovereignty of public port authorities and the increased influence of major shipping companies resurfaced. But despite the increased magnitude and significance of such an investment, this was mainly opposed at the local level by the opposition parties in the Hamburg Parliament and by trade unions, in stark contrast to the heated debates about CSP’s involvement at CTT, indicating the centrality of the geopolitical framing in the latter case (Interviews 253, 254, 255, 259, 261). Questions have also arisen about the power relations between the two major shipping companies, with MSC involved in HHLA and CSP as a subsidiary of HHLA, casting doubt on the future of the investment at CTT (Interviews 253, 254, 255).

6. Analysis and conclusion

The paper argues that analysis which emphasises China’s geopolitical ambitions in its port investments is based on a flawed assumption of a coherent state-led agenda and concomitantly of power flowing uncontested from a single source. Rather, we argue for a relational view of power which encompasses more actors, a range of relationships and a spectrum of modalities of power, many of which are much ‘quieter’ than the bellicose proclamations bound up in geopolitical discourses. Table 1 summarises the two cases in terms of the modalities of power and shows that for most of the time our studies covered authority in various forms combined with persuasion.

Table 1. Comparison of power modalities.

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Much analysis of Piraeus has framed the investment as a contest and/or cooperation between Greek and Chinese political elites (Huliaras & Petropoulos, Citation2014; Ma & Peverelli, Citation2019; Psaraftis & Pallis, Citation2012; van der Putten, Citation2019). This state-centric lens not only conflates Chinese SOEs like COSCO with monolithic state interests, but obscures the material interests of capital. It also downplays Greek agency in shaping the investment, even when such agency was structurally constrained by the troika. COSCO’s interest in the port was built on long-standing personal ties but when the push to privatise came there was tripartite authority built around the Greek state, COSCO and Greek shipping magnates. This authority has endured and arguably been bolstered by subtle forms of coercion, and most obviously promoted through various forms of persuasion and seduction on the part of COSCO and some local authorities, even though there was resistance throughout. Ultimately, authority won out with the passage of the master plan.

For a long period HHLA was able to resist the involvement of shipping companies due to its authority as one of the major container ports in Northern Europe, backed by the German state. But as HHLA’s main competitors jumped on the bandwagon of private involvement in container terminals, and given the restructuring of the sector due to the growing power of shipping companies and their alliances, Hamburg was coerced to change its strategy to regain competitiveness. Building on HHLA’s relationship with COSCO and CSP’s previous interest in investing at CTT, a mutually beneficial agreement was sought, with both sides deploying seduction and persuasion. The resulting agreement created fierce debates within the German federal government, with the coalition parties using their relational power to promote or block the agreement. A compromise was sought within the government coalition through seduction and persuasion, which resulted in the reduction of COSCO’s stake at CTT, crucially removing the company from key decision-making roles in the port. Here the relational power between the different central state actors and the local state resulted in an outcome that all parties could accept.

In terms of our comparative methodology and the modalities of power, the two cases share some similarities. In each COSCO was aligned with the desires of both the national and local governments in Germany/Hamburg and Greece/Piraeus respectively. The two ports needed investment to modernise and raise productivity and place them as strategic logistical hubs. For its part COSCO was keen to have a controlling role in both ports as this tends to facilitate greater trade with China, not only for COSCO but major shipping companies in general (MERICS, Citation2023). Here authority was the most evident modality of power which was deployed largely through legal means. Coercion was quite subtle and is, arguably, harder to identify given that it is often covert. Coercion also blurs into persuasion since ‘threats’ are often expressed as potential disbenefits to persuade audiences of the value of pursuing the investment.

Where the cases differ to a degree is that while both Greece and Germany faced persuasive international pressures to shift away from Chinese investments their responses were different. Within Germany there were strong voices pushing for de-risking if not outright de-coupling from China. Germany’s ruling coalition was split on its China strategy though relations have generally been cooling off. Speculation that Greece’s New Democracy government would be less Sinophilic has not proven true, and the country remains open to Chinese inward investment though it has realised that China is not the panacea for economic rejuvenation and so is courting a wider range of investors. That said, our cases suggest that only the national state retains significant authority even if local level actors have contesting claims. In Hamburg there were political divisions within the national coalition regarding COSCO’s investment, with some opposing it on security and resilience grounds while others were more aligned with the port-city level in welcoming the investment. Here the relational power between central and local state saw an outcome that all parties could live with. By contrast, localised resistance in Piraeus was more concerted; initially well documented labour protests, but latterly around environment and heritage, though onward investment seems probable driven by central state actors and business elites in Greece and China.

In terms of relational power, the analysis shows that authority was largely rooted in state power, but with COSCO, which is a state-influenced company, the lines between the state and capital are blurred. Given the absence of force, domination was not immediately apparent, but the over-riding authority and selective use of coercion arguably rendered force unnecessary while state authority itself is rooted in the monopoly of the use of violence even if that monopoly is rarely invoked. Hence, the projects showed alignment between the Chinese state and recipient states, though in Hamburg the governing coalition fractured which led to a compromise deal. In Greece it was more civil society opposition that disrupted the smooth development of the port but ultimately its persuasive power was limited. Our comparative analysis also reveals the multi-directional attempts at persuasion which often blurs into seduction and manipulation. Persuasion promises tangible benefits and can be packaged in a more seductive vision of a less precarious future as the port regions become key nodes in trade, logistics, leisure and manufacturing. At times these visions are generated without meaningful engagement with those communities set to be most affected and ‘facts’ are stretched to make a case, which shades into manipulation. This coupling of authority/coercion with persuasion/seduction echoes Ho’s (Citation2020) work discussed earlier about the structural and discursive power of Chinese infrastructure as well as Oakes’ (Citation2021) argument about the multiple forms of politics that ravel around such projects.

As Jensen (Citation2023) observed ‘political factors can impede Chinese involvement in ports’ (p. 48) and Blanchard (Citation2024a, p. 16) noted that port projects are often ‘not necessarily realized’ (p. 16). Both investments studied here are proceeding but not as originally intended, which suggests that when analysing Chinese-backed infrastructure projects we step back from totalising geopolitical readings of intentions to focus on embedded outcomes in places. As Gonzalez-Vicente and Cheng (Citation2025, p. 128) noted, China’s economy is treated in Anglo-American discussions as being both ‘weak’ domestically but ‘strong’ and ‘feared as a formidable tool for geoeconomic competition on the international stage’. These authors call for a ‘spotlight on the identities, discourses, and power relations underlining geoeconomics’ (p. 130) and that the spotlight is not simply shone on China as a threatening exception. That is, there are geopolitical cultures (Lin et al., Citation2019) on both sides, with some Anglo-American commentators emphasising security threats and the Chinese state-linked discourses pushing the ‘civilizational’ benefits of the BRI (Noorali & Mamadouh, Citation2025). But because such geopolitical cultures are not simply contained within elite circles and given the complexity of transnational spatial projects like the BRI, then we must interrogate both the content of these cultural claims but also their effects within specific contexts (Mallin & Sidaway, Citation2025).

We argue that multiple actors embroiled in BRI projects operate through relational power, across different modalities and that these power relations have material effects. That is, we do not treat multi-actor and multi-scaled geopolitical cultures as purely discursive in the way that earlier critical geopolitics tended to (Mallin & Sidaway, Citation2025). By focusing on agency and effects we not only move beyond the crudest Manichean geopolitical discourses of hopes versus fears, but also those which reduce agency into either elite collusion or plucky societal resistance. Li and Wang (Citation2025) usefully analysed such resistance and argued correctly that this leads to ‘adaptive’ measures on the part of Chinese actors. By focusing on the fine-grained power dynamics operating over the process of assembling and deploying port infrastructures we reveal contestations within the host state while so-called ‘local’ actors do not always align either with the central state’s interests or within the port localities themselves.