China’s Minimalist Global Military Posture: Great Power Lite?

Introduction

Why does the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as an ambitious rising twenty-first century behemoth, display a minimalist global military posture? Is China acting like a great power lite? Great powers have great ambitions that tend to extend well beyond their own borders and home regions to include global aspirations. China’s increased economic, diplomatic, and military involvement around the world has triggered concern about the extent of the PRC’s geopolitical designs. In recent years growing alarm in capitals around the world has focused on Beijing’s expanded global military posture. In Washington, the U.S. Department of Defense 2022 annual report on the Chinese military highlights China’s “growing global presence.” The document warns that the PRC “ … is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to project and sustain military power at greater distances.” Footnote 1 One prominent scholar and policymaker anticipates that by 2050, the PLA will “field a world-class force with bases around the world … .” Footnote 2

That the PRC, as a rising power, has a growing military presence on the world stage should come as no surprise. But what is surprising in the third decade of the twenty-first century is that China’s global military posture continues to be extremely modest compared to many other great powers and is likely to remain modest in coming decades. Indeed, China’s minimalist military footprint clashes with the assumption among many security scholars and the widely-held presumption in the U.S. policy community that China is steeply ramping up its overseas military presence and is poised to establish multiple bases around the world. Footnote 3 Despite the alarmism voiced by scholars and officials in the United States and other countries, the PRC’s overseas defense posture remains miniscule to date compared to the vastness of its economic presence and elevated diplomatic engagement around the world. What explains this mismatch? Why has China’s global military presence been so limited in terms of overseas deployments and basing while Beijing concentrates greater military activity and clusters new military bases around its periphery?

Great Power Lite?

Certainly, the halting rise of China’s military posture far beyond its borders can at least in part be explained by modest capabilities, especially capabilities to project and sustain military power. Yet, impressive force modernization particularly since the 1990s has noticeably enhanced these capabilities. Furthermore, the impetus of China’s economic dynamism and its global commercial and diplomatic reach since the 1980s has increased demands upon the PRC’s armed forces as well as raised popular expectations at home. Moreover, elevated great power competition with the United States since the 2010s would logically spur greater efforts to project and sustain armed force abroad. Nevertheless, to date, China’s global military presence has been remarkably minimalist.

Indeed, China’s global military posture pales in comparison to the postures of other great powers such as the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. Measured in terms of both the number of military personnel posted or deployed overseas and the number of bases far from home, China looks like a minnow. In 2020 China had 3,040 troops outside of the Asia-Pacific, compared to the United States which had 214,625 uniformed personnel operating or stationed outside the United States, Russia with 58,362 soldiers serving overseas, France with 19,137 soldiers (plus paramilitaries), and the United Kingdom with 10,962 military personnel posted outside the British Isles. Footnote 4 By this measure then, China’s global military footprint is quite small and even this figure is rather misleading since the majority of the PRC’s overseas uniformed personnel – 2,500 – were participating in seven United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in Africa and Middle East. Footnote 5 If Chinese troops in blue helmets are set aside, then China’s total out of area military presence is approximately 540 personnel stationed at a base in Djibouti and an estimated 300 People’s Armed Police (PAP) stationed at a base in Tajikistan (total does not include PLA Navy personnel deployed on three naval vessels on Gulf of Aden counter-piracy missions). When it comes to overseas bases, China also looks like a small player with one official base and a handful of facilities that I dub “stealth bases” (see below). By comparison, according to one count, the United States has as many as 750 bases beyond the boundaries of the fifty states and District of Columbia, the UK has 145 overseas bases, Russia has some “two to three dozen” overseas bases, while France reportedly has at least 13 overseas facilities. Footnote 6 In contrast to its Lilliputian military footprint globally, China is an international trading powerhouse and diplomatic giant. Indeed, China is the world’s top trader in goods: in 2018 China accounted for $4.6 trillion in global trade volume or 12.4% of the total. Footnote 7 The United States ranked a close second with $4.3 trillion worth of trade and 11.5% of the total, and Germany ranked a distant third with $2.9 trillion accounting for 7.7% of the world’s trade. China also ranks first in the number of diplomatic missions around the world. As of 2019, China possessed 276 diplomatic posts compared to 273 U.S. posts. Rounding out the top five countries were France with 267 diplomatic missions around the world, Japan with 247, and Russia with 242 posts. Footnote 8 The United Kingdom ranked 11th with 205 diplomatic missions worldwide.

Domestic Drivers

Why does China have such a miniscule worldwide military presence today? Beijing – propelled by two dominant domestic actors, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA – ought to have ramped up its global defense posture years ago. After all, China’s communist rulers are widely assumed to be highly ambitious hard-core realists while its military leaders are considered hawkish nationalists. One leading scholar has described Beijing as “the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world,” Footnote 9 while another respected scholar has identified an enduring “parabellum” or realpolitik Chinese strategic culture dating back centuries. Footnote 10 Other research reveals that Chinese soldiers hold views distinct from China’s statesmen albeit quite consistent with their civilian counterparts. Footnote 11

Ambitious Chinese Statesmen

As realists, one would expect PRC leaders to move promptly in establishing a significant global military posture commensurate with China’s greater worldwide economic presence and its expanding set of overseas interests. If offensive realists, one would anticipate Beijing to engage in major military activities, including interstate wars and skirmishes, invasions and occupations of territories deemed important to China. While Beijing has demonstrated increased military assertiveness in recent decades, such activity has been far less bellicose than offensive realism would expect and largely confined to China’s immediate periphery. Moreover, Chinese military presence beyond its own neighborhood – including the South China Sea – has been remarkably limited for a great power with burgeoning operational capabilities combined with substantial and expanding global interests.

If Chinese statesmen are defensive realists, one would anticipate Beijing to engage in greater military activity but of a more restrained nature. One would also expect to see Beijing developing alliance networks to strengthen its security situation. Yet, as of 2022, China has only established a single formal alliance with North Korea by a 1961 treaty. Despite the absence of other explicit alliance relationships, China has formed more than one hundred of what it labels “strategic partnerships” with states around the world, a good number of which have alliance-like characteristics, including active military exchanges, bilateral field exercises, and arms sales. Footnote 12 Moreover, Beijing has formed at least one multilateral organization with a high-profile military component: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The organization has been depicted as an alliance with some even dubbing it the “NATO of the East.” Footnote 13 However, the SCO is far from a military alliance. Although multiple rounds of field exercises have been held since 2003 under SCO auspices, the organization possesses no NATO-like standing military headquarters staff, nor does SCO maintain a centralized command structure. Furthermore, member states do not base troops on the territories of other member states. Footnote 14

Chinese Realpolitik Soldiers

The PLA is widely considered to be an influential actor in PRC foreign and national security policymaking. Footnote 15 However, opinions vary regarding those issues on which China’s military is influential, how this influence is exerted, and to what ends. There is widespread consensus that PLA leaders – like their military counterparts in other countries – tend to be realist, conservative, pessimistic, and highly nationalistic. Footnote 16 Nevertheless, if the military was a powerful player, then one would expect the PLA to lobby for policies and strategies that would raise the defense budget, increase its political influence, and raise its profile, including an expanded global posture. While the PLA has been a vociferous, assertive, and high-profile proponent of a more robust military posture close to home, including in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and vis-à-vis Taiwan, Footnote 17 there is little evidence that the PLA has been a strong proponent of expanding China’s military posture further afield. Indeed, to the contrary, it appears that China’s armed forces have acted as a brake on China’s global military presence (see below).

Significantly, the PLA has been neither a cheerleader of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) nor a prominent advocate of building up military capabilities to protect BRI projects and expanding the PLA’s global posture. Chinese leaders, especially soldiers, have been “ambivalent” about military options, and many have stressed the “limits on the PLA’s ability to safeguard overseas Chinese interests and recommend alternative solutions.” Footnote 18 Few military figures have voiced support for an expanded global posture although many PLA leaders and military commentators have given “lip service” to the importance of BRI. Footnote 19 While extended discussion and deeper analysis by PLA figures has been “rather rare,” Footnote 20 debate is discernible among military analysts about how prepared China’s armed forces are to support BRI projects. Footnote 21 In fact, the PLA itself has not been an advocate of global military posture; rather, the armed forces had to be pushed and prodded toward deployments well beyond the borders of the PRC. Indeed, it was other bureaucratic actors who have championed greater overseas presence. For example, the Gulf of Aden counter-piracy mission was pushed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), while “the Chinese military was not enthusiastic” about the move and it took two months for the MFA to get agreement from the PLA. Footnote 22

Where Has Beijing Built Bases?

One would expect to see Chinese statesmen and soldiers, whether offensive or defensive realists, actively building – or at least preparing to build – a network of overseas military bases to protect its expanding interests around the world. Although Beijing has across the past four decades established new military installations in a wide range of locations, the vast majority – some 57 bases – have been located around China’s periphery. These include 19 separate facilities in Hong Kong accommodating an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 troops, and one site in Macao housing approximately 500 or 600 soldiers. Footnote 23 Since the 1990s, Beijing has built at least 27 “outposts” in the South China Sea (20 in the Paracel’s and 7 in the Spratlys), Footnote 24 likely garrisoned by combined total of several hundred uniformed personnel.

This article illuminates how geostrategic and normative factors have predisposed political and military leaders to be so hesitant to expand Beijing’s global military presence and why this is likely to continue. After reviewing the literature on China’s global ambitions and on China’s overseas military presence, the article proceeds to define key terms, considers whether Chinese leaders have a global military strategy. Next the article considers three possible logics driving the establishment of overseas bases and then analyzes what led Beijing to site China’s first official overseas base in Djibouti. The article highlights the impact of two geostrategic and two normative domestic factors on PRC and PLA approaches to China’s global military posture. Together, these factors explain China’s minimalist global footprint and heavy concentration of overseas bases on the PRC’s periphery. Lastly, the article speculates about the future trajectory of China’s overseas posture and concludes that Beijing’s global military presence is likely to remain very modest in coming decades.

Literature, Definitions, Explanations, Strategy

While there is remarkable consensus that Beijing – especially under the leadership of Xi Jinping – is extremely ambitious, Footnote 25 scholars differ on what specific worldwide ambitions Chinese leaders have. These differences are not surprising given that Beijing has been very vague about articulating its global goals. Footnote 26 Scholarship examining China’s global designs fall into three main camps. The most prominent camp insists that China seeks to displace the United States and dominate the world. Footnote 27 Beijing’s ambitions are interpreted as maximalist and global in scope consistent both with the grandiosity of Xi Jinping era official rhetoric and the expansionist aspirations and pugnacious activities of twentieth century revisionist powers such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. A second camp contends that China’s sights are largely fixated regionally: to dominate its own extended neighborhood and its global ambitions are more limited albeit significant. Footnote 28 Beijing’s most clearly articulated goals concern domestic matters and affairs around its periphery – notably realizing unification with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Beijing’s global aims seem focused upon attaining great power status and having a greater say in world affairs. Footnote 29 A third camp posits that Beijing is still making up its mind. Footnote 30 To date, official Chinese rhetoric, documents and activities on global security matters are sufficiently fuzzy or tentative that there is “no conclusive evidence” to support the existence of an uber-ambitious global Beijing strategy. Footnote 31

The study of China’s overseas military posture tends to be compartmentalized and focus narrowly on six specific types of activities. A first area of focus is on the use of armed force in wars and coercion. Even this literature is subdivided into studies of military conflict and studies of crisis behavior. Footnote 32 A second area of focus is on Chinese participation in UNPKO. Footnote 33 A third area of focus is on Chinese naval operations. Footnote 34 A fourth area of focus is on Chinese field exercises and noncombat operations. Footnote 35 A fifth area of focus examines PLA progress on power projection efforts and evolving expeditionary capabilities. Footnote 36 A sixth area of focus is on Beijing initiatives to establish overseas bases and access. Footnote 37 To date there is no scholarship that analyzes the overall scope and trends of China’s global military posture as most research focuses on China’s regional presence because that is where PRC military and paramilitary forces are most active.

Definitions

Global posture is the output of a great power’s defense policy designed to advance national security goals by “positioning … military forces around the world.” This includes plans and decisions to “arrange and support … [a] … network of troops, weapons, bases, and alliances” to advance defense policy and national security goals. Footnote 38 Not surprisingly, only great powers think strategically on a global scale. It is noteworthy that one of the first things incoming U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin did in early 2021 after the Biden administration took office was to order a “global posture review.” Footnote 39 Armed forces refer to a country’s military or paramilitary formations. In the PRC, these formations include the regular and reserve forces of the PLA, the People’s Militia, and the PAP (which includes the Coast Guard). Footnote 40

A military base is a bunker, barracks, dock, pier, fortification, or other type of installation intended to shelter, protect, or be otherwise used by a country’s armed forces. The facility can function as a command post, observation post, a training ground, or as a storehouse for equipment and supplies. Footnote 41 Overseas refers to any area beyond the territory controlled and occupied by Beijing in the first year of the PRC – prior to October 1950. Footnote 42 Thus, overseas refers not just to foreign countries far beyond China’s borders – such as the small African state of Djibouti–but also includes the Paracel and Spratly Islands as well as reefs, atolls, and artificial islands constructed in the South China Sea. Overseas includes the mountainous terrain along China’s disputed western border with India, and the former British colony of Hong Kong and the former Portuguese territory of Macao. Of course, this definition of “overseas” is not one to which Beijing subscribes; nevertheless, it is a useful conception when discerning trends across the decades in PRC military basing.

Does China Have a Global Military Strategy?

Whether Beijing has a global military strategy is not clear. China’s global military posture has shifted gradually as Beijing perceives a specific need or opportunity. The evolution has occurred in fits and starts but the overarching shift is clear and discernible across two arenas: Beijing’s geostrategic outlook has evolved and the PRC’s domestic discourse on security norms and defense concepts has expanded to embrace a broader array of national interests and security threats. This incremental process has shaken up an enduring military tradition of “close-to-home” operational experience and the inertia of a deeply entrenched command culture of close control within the PRC’s armed forces. In combination, these factors served as a potent set of inhibitors to adopting a global military strategy or even new initiatives for deployments and basing abroad.

Assumptions about Chinese culture and traditions generate analysis that concludes Beijing’s leaders are gifted strategic thinkers who adopt long-term outlooks on all matters of statecraft and national security. Footnote 43 It is clear the CCP has a penchant for planning and formulates multi-year plans for virtually every endeavor, including national defense. Footnote 44 Yet, as noted earlier, there is no hard evidence of Beijing adopting a global military strategy, or for that matter a master plan to create a new China-centric world order. Certainly, a review of key works of military strategy do not reveal evidence of a global military strategy. Footnote 45

Although the PRC’s posture may be distinctive, the absence of a well thought out plan or strategy is not unusual for a great power. While great powers throughout history have tended not to develop detailed implementation plans for armed occupations or military outposts, they have held grandiose dreams for empire building or at least carving out sizable spheres of influence. In fact, some great powers seem to stumble into empires or expanded overseas military presences because of unexpected or unforeseen outcomes.

The United States, for example, acquired a sizable and mostly unwanted archipelago in the Philippines in 1898 when the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic Squadron won a surprisingly swift and thorough triumph over a Spanish flotilla in Manila Bay. This unexpected victory triggered “the collapse of Spanish imperial power.” Footnote 46 Then, half a century later, the United States found itself in possession of a worldwide network of military installations in the aftermath of victory in World War II. As one careful analysis of trends in U.S. overseas basing concluded: “Historically, major changes in the U.S. global defense posture have only been successfully implemented in the wake of an exogenous shock.” Footnote 47

Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that China does not possess a specific plan for world military expansion. While the PLA articulated a regional maritime roadmap back in the 1980s, Footnote 48 the most high-profile mention of the world in direct reference to China’s military to date has been in the context of an ambiguous PRC ambition to build a “world-class military.” Footnote 49 Even if the PRC does not have an explicit strategy or central logic for a global defense posture, Beijing has clearly given serious thought to the topic of overseas military presence. In recent decades Beijing has reexamined national security principles and defense concepts based upon shifting realities (see below).

What Is the Logic of China’s Overseas Basing?

While China appears reticent to project or station its armed forces beyond its immediate neighborhood, military activity and the construction of military installations around the PRC’s periphery have expanded noticeably in recent decades. In the late 1990s Beijing acquired bases in Hong Kong and Macao, stationing garrisons in these territories. More recently Beijing has built multiple bases and structures on reefs and artificial islands in the South China Sea, Footnote 50 along the disputed border in the Himalayas, Footnote 51 and still others in Central Asia. Footnote 52 Yet, Beijing somehow overcame its reluctance to establish bases further afield and its recent military facility in Djibouti sets the stage for additional out of area installations in coming years.

Unanswered questions include: what will be the logic driving the establishment of new overseas bases, where will they be located, and how will they be organized? The future trajectory of China’s overseas basing posture depends on the logic undergirding it. Assessing Beijing’s overseas military posture to date and surveying external analyses of this presence, one can discern three distinct logics propelling PRC overseas basing.

One compelling logic is the protection of the PRC’s burgeoning overseas interests. This rationale means prioritizing trade routes as well as concentrations of PRC citizens and hubs of investment and property – certainly this appears to be a key reason behind the establishment of the PLA base in Djibouti. Footnote 53 The logic is also evident in how China manages supply, replenishment, maintenance, and repair of PLA Navy vessels through an extensive network of party-state-owned or managed commercial ports around the world. Footnote 54

China conducts extensive international trade, has substantial investments and numerous properties across the globe, and millions of PRC citizens work and travel abroad. However, almost a decade after the BRI’s official launch in 2013, it is noteworthy that Beijing has yet to articulate an explicit security or military component. Footnote 55 Of course, this omission may be intentional since this element would likely be controversial at home and abroad.

Yet, a fundamental question remains: how the PRC will protect its expanding overseas interests and vast array of infrastructure projects? Available evidence suggests that Beijing is still grappling with this question. Footnote 56 In lieu of a detailed roadmap, the PRC appears to have embraced an ad hoc approach with multiple overarching logics. China’s first official overseas base in Djibouti appears to be neither a “one off” development nor the first step in a well-crafted multi-step masterplan. Beijing’s selection of Djibouti “is characteristic of [what Chinese analysts call] the strategic strongpoint model … . [which involves a] comprehensive approach to first developing a commercial transport and logistics hub … .” Footnote 57 In other words, “party-state priorities to access emerging markets and protect vital state interests in the [“Western Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa”] region drive this process forward.” Footnote 58 Whatever the reason, the reality remains that on the world stage where China is concerned, the flag lags as it follows trade and investment. Footnote 59

A second emerging logic for China’s global military activism is great power competition. This rationale for overseas bases means that Beijing is competing with other great powers for geostrategic influence and power projection and sustainment in various regions of the world. Footnote 60 The PLA has engaged in an increasing array of small but attention-grabbing field exercises in a wide range of locations. For example, the PLA Navy conducted a July 2017 exercise with the Russian navy in the Baltic Sea and the PLA Air Force long-range bombers conducted a July 2019 exercise with Russian aircraft in the Sea of Japan near the Korean Peninsula. Such small-scale but high-profile activities suggest that a key purpose is to get noticed, signaling China’s emergence as a global military player. Great power logic would suggest a Chinese base in the South Pacific or perhaps in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A third is the legacy logic of territorial defense. This rationale has tended to be dominant and has seen a focus on placement to defend the PRC’s frontiers and periphery. There is also a legacy of defense in depth and defense of CCP rule hence the PLA’s order of battle has military units garrisoned near major urban areas along the eastern seaboard with a much lighter military footprint in underpopulated border areas and western China. Yet, since the 1990s Beijing has focused upon enhanced efforts to strengthen territorial claims in the South China Sea and Himalayas through construction of new base structures in forward locations intended to change the facts in the water or on the ground.

Indeed, China has concentrated its military resources in pursuit of top priority national security goals – sovereignty and territorial integrity – with a consuming focus on the neighborhood, especially on the PRC’s periphery. Hence, overseas bases were first established in the maritime domain – in and around the South China Sea – and in the continental domain at or just beyond landlocked borders in the Himalayas and Pamirs. Yet, over time Beijing’s geostrategic thinking came to embrace a broader conception of a region that looms larger for China to include not just Central Asia and South Asia – both continental and maritime – but also the Middle East. Consequently, Beijing launched a stealth basing initiative around China’s periphery in the 1990s evolving into a series of bases or logistics facilities in the Indian Ocean’s rimlands and littorals, culminating in the establishment of the PRC’s first official out of area base in 2017.

These three logics can either reinforce or compete. Considerable range is possible over where Beijing decides to locate future overseas bases depending upon the logic employed. Prioritizing commercial and economic interests could produce a “string of pearls” configuration around the rim of the Indian Ocean. Footnote 61 Attention to great power competition could lead the PRC to locate its bases in geopolitically important areas and countries widely dispersed as “regional hubs.” Footnote 62 A continued top priority of homeland defense could steer Beijing to expand further the constellation of bases arranged around the PRC in “rings of security.” Footnote 63

Why Djibouti?

How did China’s political and military leaders reach the landmark decision to establish the country’s first official overseas base? The policy switch constituted a radical break with longstanding PRC principles as well as decades of a close-to-home defense tradition and a command culture of close control (see following sections). The decision was a difficult one likely only made possible because of a remarkable consensus among multiple Chinese leaders and bureaucratic actors on two points: (1) that the time had come to reverse China’s high-profile policy against overseas basing, and (2) that Djibouti was unquestionably the most appropriate location for Beijing’s first overseas base. Footnote 64

As noted above, military leaders were unenthusiastic about an expanded global posture. Yet, by the mid-2010s, China’s armed forces had been called upon to conduct a growing number of overseas missions far from home and the PLA had strained and stretched to execute multiple out of area operations. Grappling with these challenges pushed military leaders to consider all options – even heretofore unthinkable ones. Consequently, the possibility of distant overseas bases became a matter of serious contemplation, and in 2013 the CMC commissioned the National Defense University to study this issue and report its findings. Footnote 65 But floating the idea and then building support for a decision that Beijing should establish overseas bases was merely an initial – albeit important – step. The second step – to identify and gain broad domestic consensus for the location of the first base – also constituted a major hurdle. Consensus was necessary because the PLA seemed extremely cautious and wary, which is understandable since the step was bold and unprecedented with significant risk.

That the PLA sought support and approval from other domestic actors says less about the relative power and influence of various bureaucratic players than it does about the armed forces’ desire for reassurance that the decision was the right one. From the PLA’s perspective Djibouti was a good choice because it was proximate to the Chinese navy’s on-going counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, near to multiple UNPKO missions in which the PLA was involved in Africa. Moreover, the PLA had been called upon to assist in or organize evacuations of PRC citizens from Middle East. Indeed, this rationale was underscored by the fact that “the final stages of negotiations” between Beijing and Djibouti “took place against the background” of the PLA Navy’s March 2015 evacuation of hundreds of PRC citizens from Yemen. Footnote 66

From the perspective of senior CCP leaders and the MFA, the location was a good choice because Djibouti was a politically stable and friendly state that welcomed a Chinese base. Footnote 67 The choice was noncontroversial since the country already played host to military bases of several other countries, including the United States, France, and Japan. Moreover, proximity to these bases was not considered problematic because Djibouti was not expected to have a wartime function. China’s Ministry of Commerce, other bureaucracies as well as state- owned enterprises – including China Merchants Group (CMG) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corp (CCECC) – all appeared supportive because of the sizable Chinese commercial presence in Djibouti and nearby states. CMG signed a 2013 contract with the Djibouti Port and Free Zone Authority and two years later signed an agreement to build a Doraleh multipurpose port. Footnote 68 Of six berths to be constructed, one was specifically designated for the use of the PLA Navy. Footnote 69

Djibouti’s importance was further highlighted by China’s burgeoning investments and expanding economic activities in neighboring Ethiopia – Africa’s second most populace state and the headquarters of the African Union. China’s involvement via the Export-Import Bank of China and CCECC included the construction of a railway between Djibouti and Addis Ababa. Footnote 70 China has a substantial and extensive commercial and investment presence in and around the Red Sea. Footnote 71 In Beijing, a clear consensus soon emerged that Djibouti presented “an unusual opportunity” Footnote 72 and was far and away the top location for the PRC’s first official overseas military base.

What’s Driving China’s Minimalist Global Military Posture?

If there is no detailed plan or overarching strategy, then what propels China’s minimalist global defense posture? Four factors have shaped China’s sluggish global military presence: two of these have produced significant but incremental change while two others have acted as braking mechanisms. The change is the result of a shift over recent decades in the PRC’s geostrategic outlook and a significant albeit slow socialization of an expanded official national security lexicon – the manifestation of an extended domestic discourse on national security – in recent decades. The continuity is due to the military’s extended record of close-to-home operational experience and a deeply ingrained command culture of rigid close control. Each factor is examined in turn.

Beijing’s “Nested” Geostrategic Outlook

China’s abiding reluctance to expand its global military posture is rooted in the Beijing regime’s “nested” worldview. This present-day PRC geostrategic perspective is shaped by the specific experiences of the ruling regime and the dominant national security narratives of the broad sweep of Chinese history. The lessons learned by PRC leaders from the past color the way they view their contemporary security environment and shape the menu of options from which they select to address national security problems.

The first major lesson the regime draws from an analysis of the historical trajectory of Chinese civilization is that the central challenge facing successive generations of rulers has been how to maintain domestic order at all costs. Footnote 73 This is not to say that there is not a clear recognition that China has repeatedly faced serious external threats; rather, in the eyes of these Chinese leaders, their ability to counter a foreign threat successfully is contingent upon how successful they are in maintaining domestic stability. A second major lesson for Beijing rulers from studying thousands of years of dynastic history is that a unified China is a strong state, while a divided China is a weak state. Footnote 74

Most relevant to PRC statesmen and soldiers is the experience of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the initial three decades as an armed insurgency movement followed by seven decades as a ruling political-military regime. While the regime in Beijing is typically described as a party-state, this is not a complete characterization. A more appropriate conception is tripartite since there are three distinct bureaucratic systems: a party, a military, and a state. Footnote 75 The CCP came first, founded in 1921, followed six years later by the PLA and eventually the PRC joined as a third constituent element in 1949. The relevance of this conception is underscored by the fact that since the 1990s, China’s top leader has concurrently held the top post in each system: PRC President, CCP General Secretary, and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chair. This historical experience and bureaucratic configuration produce two fundamental presumptions by Beijing’s rulers. First, they conflate regime security with national security. Second, they perceive the PLA to be the CCP’s armed appendage. Footnote 76 In other words, in the eyes of PRC rulers the party is synonymous with the state and the primary mission of the military is to protect the party.

Socialization of this experience produces a cocooned geostrategic outlook among PRC rulers in which the CCP and its central leadership is “nested” within four concentric rings of security. Footnote 77 The first ring is the most sensitive and important: territories currently claimed and controlled by the regime. The second ring consists of continental and maritime areas just beyond the PRC’s borders, all around China’s immediate periphery. The third ring encompasses China’s extended Asia-Pacific neighborhood to include Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. The fourth and outermost ring comprises the remainder of the world.

Not surprisingly, Beijing prioritizes security in the inner rings over security in outer rings; indeed, this is where the regime concentrates resources and attention. Nevertheless, over time Beijing’s geostrategic outlook has shifted as China has become more engaged internationally and active beyond PRC borders. The relative importance of the second ring has been elevated and Beijing has begun to devote more resources and efforts to stabilize its periphery and concurrently expand its influence. The first three decades of the “reform and opening” policy disproportionately benefited eastern China with prosperity and economic growth concentrated in coastal provinces as China’s opening emphasized the maritime realm. Moreover, this skewed growth highlighted to Beijing the vulnerability of China’s seaboard development to the world’s dominant sea power. From Beijing’s perspective, the United States effectively “contains” China by its domination of offshore island chains and a set of alliance relationships even as the United States supported and facilitated China’s economic take-off. Footnote 78

Beijing Rebalances

For Beijing, the remedy for this vulnerability and skewed development was to rebalance China’s development geostrategically. The most high-profile foreign policy initiative in this regard was the formal launch in 2013 of China’s BRI. This ambitious effort to stimulate Chinese investment in and construction of major overseas infrastructure projects quickly became China’s twenty-first century flagship foreign policy initiative. Significantly, BRI contains both continental and oceanic components: an overland “belt” and a maritime “road.” The initiative is associated closely with Xi Jinping: the Chinese leader officially launched BRI during the first twelve months of his tenure with much fanfare delivering high-profile speeches in Central Asia (Kazakhstan in September) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia in October). Yet the initiative did not come out of nowhere; indeed, BRI was the logical evolution of earlier initiatives albeit on a far grander and more ambitious scale.

Foremost among these earlier initiatives was the “Western Development Program” launched in 2000 to bring economic growth and prosperity to China’s hinterlands with a focus on massive infrastructure projects, including highways, railways, and pipelines. Footnote 79 Following on the heels of this effort came the two most serious episodes of ethnic unrest to hit western China in many decades: in Tibet in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009. Subsequently calls emerged for Beijing to pay much greater attention to the country’s westernmost regions. Among the most prominent advocates for focusing greater attention to China’s far west were National Defense University political commissar Major General Liu Yazhou and Peking University professor Wang Jisi. In 2010, Liu emphasized the importance of western China as a “vast empty expanse” of untapped potential and the gateway to Central Asia (“close to the center of the world”). Footnote 80 Liu argued that China’s “west should be [the country’s] center of gravity,” and rather than a “frontier” region, Beijing should view it as a “hinterland.” Footnote 81 Two years later Wang wrote an opinion piece urging Beijing to “march west.” Footnote 82 Yet Wang was not advocating for the use of force, military conquest, or even a military buildup in the landlocked west. Rather, he articulated an urgent need for China to undertake a “geostrategic rebalance” so that Beijing could concentrate greater efforts toward inland China and Central Asia to counterbalance an extended Chinese overemphasis on coastal regions and maritime East Asia.

In the 2000s, Beijing also paid increased attention to western China and Xinjiang in particular because of heightened concerns about transnational Islamic extremism and U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a U.S. military footprint in Central Asia in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Then, the 2010s witnessed greater turmoil and instability in countries across the Middle East. Taken together these developments only served to heighten the sensitivity with which Beijing perceived the region and how the once distant Middle East seemed to move much closer and become more threatening. This is indicated by the formulation by Chinese analysts of the geographic term: “Greater Middle East” [Da Zhong Dong]. According to one scholar, this signaled a new reality that the Middle East had essentially become a “strategic extension of China’s periphery.” Footnote 83

Internal Security First

In addition to the experience of pre-1949 CCP-PLA insurgency and post-1949 CCP-PLA-PRC regime, Chinese leaders are socialized to an official narrative interpreting thousands of years of Chinese history. Two major lessons noted earlier translate into two central national security challenges for the CCP: ensuring domestic order and realizing national unity. These lessons are reinforced by the experience of modern Chinese history – the so-called “century of humiliation” in which China was first bullied by Western powers and then a modernized Japan. China was coerced to give up sovereignty via “unequal treaties” and was carved up into foreign-controlled colonies, foreign concessions, and foreign spheres of influence all enforced by military might. Footnote 84 This narrative highlights the importance of national unification and serves as a regular reminder of the unfinished task of unification with Taiwan.

The overarching historical narrative and the two internalized lessons identified above produce a PRC elite whose outlook is dominated by perceived threats to internal security and obstacles to national unification. While Chinese leaders do not ignore external threats, they tend to focus disproportionately on domestic challenges or the perceived internal manifestations of external threats. In the twenty-first century, Beijing’s nested geostrategic outlook remains strong but the precise boundaries of the four rings of insecurity have blurred because of multiple unresolved conflicts and confrontations within China’s second ring as well as China’s greater engagement with and expanded awareness of the wider global system.

Continuity and Change in Beijing’s National Security Lexicon

Beijing’s receptiveness to developing a global military posture required a significant reappraisal of its security norms and national interests. It is hard to overemphasize the importance of words and phrasing for the CCP-PLA-PRC regime. Official verbiage should not be dismissed as mere propaganda or “empty rhetoric” Footnote 85; rather, statements, speeches, and documents are filled with carefully chosen words and heavily vetted phrases and mantras. These tend to reflect widely held normative beliefs. A change in official rhetoric on a particular issue invariably signals a significant shift in thinking and a new policy direction and the outcome of considerable debate and discourse. Since this discourse is rarely conducted in public and often difficult to track, Beijing’s lexicon is used as a proxy for Chinese national security discourse. There have been major changes in China’s official national security lexicon since the 1980s. These reflect important evolutions in norms, principles, and concepts as Chinese discourse on security developed in response to major changes in China’s engagement with the wider world and adjustments to its vital national interests.

PRC propaganda emphasizes that China has a different set of norms and principles from other great powers and does not seek to dominate other countries nor seize lands or waters beyond the territories Beijing has long claimed in the so-called Near Seas or along its disputed land border with India. Footnote 86 PRC documents and speeches are filled with references to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which emerged in the CCP-PLA’s pre-1949 capital of Yanan out of extended ruminations about what ideals and concepts should undergird the foreign policy of the new China. Footnote 87 These Five Principles were then prominently promulgated in the 1950s – first during the normalization of diplomatic relations between the PRC and India and later during the Bandung Conference of the Nonaligned Movement held in Indonesia in 1955. Footnote 88 The five principles are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

Beijing is fond of insisting that China “has never occupied an inch of others’ land,” Footnote 89 nor has China been in the habit of stationed its troops in other countries. Indeed, successive generations of regime leaders, diplomats, and soldiers revered the concepts of “mutual respect of territorial integrity” and “nonaggression.” This was why Beijing has gone to considerable lengths to justify every military conflict that post-1949 China engaged in as “self-defense counterattacks” [ziwei fanji] including the 1962 border war with India. Footnote 90 The PRC is adamant that in every instance the other country was the aggressor and China was simply defending its sovereign territory. Footnote 91

Beijing itself is hyper-territorial and views the basing of troops on PRC claimed terrain as a powerful symbol of national sovereignty. This much is clear from the promptness with which PLA garrisons were established in Hong Kong and Macao the moment these former colonies became PRC Special Administrative Regions in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Indeed, in 1984, more than a decade before the handover, top Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping made a point of publicly declaring that: “After restoring the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, China will dispatch its troops to be stationed there.” Footnote 92

Giant Economic Leaps, Military Baby Steps

The evolution of Chinese national security thinking since the 1970s can be discerned from a review of the verbiage of major official documents and prominent speeches by PRC leaders over the years. On the issue of dispatching members of China’s armed forces overseas or establishing military bases abroad, the rhetoric in the initial years of the reform era tended to be emphatic and absolute. In 1982, the PRC promulgated a new state constitution and enshrined within it the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. That same year, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang declared to the 12th Party Congress: “We [China] do not station a single soldier abroad, nor have we occupied a single inch of foreign land. We have never infringed upon the sovereignty of another country, or imposed an unequal relationship upon it. In no circumstances will we seek hegemony.” Footnote 93

China’s national security lexicon expanded during the 1990s with the emergence of the New Security Concept – essentially a reformulation of the Five Principles – and lively discourse on nontraditional security threats as rising serious challenges for China and the world and Beijing began to participate in UNPKOs. By the turn of the century, a high-profile official document made the case for “the development of a new security concept” to ensure “world peace and security.” Footnote 94 The same document restated Beijing’s stance on overseas military posture but in more subdued language. According to the PRC defense white paper of 2000: “China does not seek military expansion, nor does it station troops. or set up military bases in any foreign country.” Footnote 95

In late 2004, CCP leader Hu Jintao, in his inaugural meeting as chairman of the CMC, announced a set of “New Historic Missions” for the PLA which for the first time explicitly identified overseas responsibilities for China’s armed forces. These missions were: guaranteeing Party rule, safeguarding China’s economic development, protecting the country’s national interests, and ensuring world peace. Two years later these four missions were enshrined in the 2006 iteration of China’s defense white paper. Footnote 96 Along with these new missions emerged a concept: “development interests” – a term that first appeared in the China’s 2004 defense white paper. Footnote 97 The inclusion of the term “ … officially signalled for the first time that the PLA was ordered to operate abroad … to defend China’s interests as an extension of its traditional mission of defending the [regime]. … ” Footnote 98

From Nontraditional Security Threats to Overseas Logistics Facilities

Then, in 2005, PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff General Xiong Guangkai underscored the significance to China of nontraditional security threats. He observed:

While such traditional security threats as hegemonism and local wars are still casting a shadow on world peace and stability, events such as the 11 September terror incident, the atypical pneumonia epidemic [i.e., SARS] … have indicated that nontraditional security threats are becoming ever more prominent … . How to deal with such threats and challenges originating from nontraditional security areas has become a major issue … . Footnote 99

According to Chinese analysts and scholars, nontraditional security threats have three ominous features. First, they “blur” the “line between internal and external” national security challenges and second, they are volatile and unpredictable. Footnote 100 Third, they are “interwoven and interactive” with traditional security threats. Footnote 101

During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, nontraditional security threats emerged as a dual challenge for China – threatening the country both at home and abroad. Within China, the Falun Gong movement, which Beijing regarded as a dangerous cult, continued to be active domestically after a 1999 crackdown despite being outlawed in China as its leader continued to lead the movement from exile in the United States. Also, within China ethnic unrest simmered as Beijing conflated the discontent in Tibet and Xinjiang with terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Externally, China’s billions of dollars of foreign investments, commercial facilities and hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers confronted dangers of crime, social unrest, political violence, and civil wars in locales around the world. The magnitude of these threats was highlighted by the Arab Spring which swept across the Middle East in 2011.

As these multiple challenges manifest themselves as real threats to China’s overseas interests, Chinese thinking about the role and utility of its armed forces evolved. Hu Jintao, in a December 2007 speech to the CMC introduced the concept of “Military Operations Other Than War” [feizhanzheng junshi xingdong] a term that was then enshrined in the 2008 defense white paper. The white paper announced that China was adopting new military strategic guidelines and that the PRC had determined: “military operations other than war (MOOTW) … [had become] an important form of” military missions. Footnote 102 According to the document, MOOTW included overseas missions for the armed forces such as, “counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency rescue and international peacekeeping.” This evolution of Beijing’s national security lexicon “expanded the [Chinese] understanding of security and consequently, the PLA’s missions.” Footnote 103

An evolution was also evident in the military’s thinking about overseas basing. For example, the 2001 iteration of the authoritative text, the Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlue xue) discussed only in abstract terms the importance to the PLA Navy of “various operational facilities” in “sea zones and coastal areas” for “logistical support [and] equipment maintenance.” Footnote 104 A decade later (in 2013), the next edition of the Science of Military Strategy discussed in a very concrete manner the necessity of “building strategic strongpoints … providing service for overseas military operations or serving as a forward base for the deployment of military forces overseas [including in the Pacific and Indian Oceans].” Footnote 105

No longer did Beijing proudly proclaim that it did not station troops abroad or set up bases in other countries in key official documents and senior leader speeches, such as the Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s August 2020 address to the French Institute of International Relations. Footnote 106 Furthermore, the 2019 iteration of the PRC’s defense white paper did not simply omit this mantra but went further to matter-of-factly state that the PLA “develops overseas logistical facilities.” Footnote 107 The white paper goes on in the next paragraph to announce the establishment of China’s first official overseas base of the reform era: “In August 2017, the PLA Djibouti Support Base entered service. The base has provided equipment for the maintenance of four escort task groups, offered medical services for over 100 officers and sailors on board, conducted joint medical exercises with foreign militaries, and donated over 600 teaching aids to local schools.” Footnote 108

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence remain central in Beijing’s national security lexicon, reinforced by the New Security Concept. Nevertheless, China’s national security thinking evolved as Beijing, emphasizing China contributions to world peace, grappled with a new category of threats–nontraditional security problems – and an expanding array of overseas interests.

A Tradition of Territorial Defense and Protecting the Periphery

The “close-to-home” tradition of China’s armed forces generates significant resistance within the PLA toward establishing a global military posture. The military experience of the PRC differs from that of the United States, Russia/ USSR, United Kingdom and France. Unlike these other great powers, China does not have an extensive history of operating or stationing significant numbers of soldiers or sailors beyond its borders in the modern era. The strategic stance has been territorial defense and the operational focus has been on China’s perimeter or periphery combined with enduring domestic duties. Yet, as noted above, a shifting geostrategic outlook extended the PRC’s periphery to the “Greater Middle East” and national security discourse expanded China’s “interest frontiers” far beyond homeland and neighborhood. Footnote 109

Moreover, since 1949 territorial defense has been zonal with the PRC divided into military regions with commanders having considerable authority within their own jurisdictions and the result being at times de facto independent kingdoms. In addition, the PLA ground force has long retained dominant service status. The General Staff Department (GSD), which was established in 1954 – before being abolished in 2016 – while officially serving as general staff for the entire PLA, essentially functioned as headquarters staff for the ground forces. The upshot was that for more than six decades the PLA operated as a parochial, land power-centric, and domestically focused military. Footnote 110

The PLA has long been occupied with internal responsibilities. During the earliest days of the PRC, the armed forces – at the behest of the CCP – administered much of newly “liberated” China. Moreover, at various times the PLA has been called upon to leave the barracks, restore order, and then temporarily govern at the subnational level. One notable instance occurred during the late 1960s when Mao ordered the PLA to quash the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and administer all provinces, municipalities, counties, and grassroots entities across the entire country. While the PRC was under de facto military rule for almost a decade, the PLA as an institution never exerted political control at the national level. Footnote 111 A second high-profile example was in 1989 when the military intervened to suppress protests, first in Tibet’s capital of Lhasa in March, and then in Beijing in May, when martial law formally declared in each city.

Stealth Employments and Deployments on the Periphery

In addition to significant domestic responsibilities, the PRC’s armed forces have been repeatedly used abroad since 1949 but always close to home. There are some well-known Chinese employments of military force at and just beyond its borders: these include against U.S. and South Korean forces in 1950, against India in 1962, against the Soviet Union in 1969, against South Vietnamese forces occupying the Paracel Islands in 1974, on land against a unified Vietnam in 1979, and against Vietnamese maritime forces near the Spratly Islands in 1988. While Beijing has not hesitated to use force around the PRC’s periphery across the decades, most of these employments have been small-scale actions for limited goals and of short duration. The exceptions to the rule are the uses of armed force in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1979 (see below). But there are also lesser-known extended stealth deployments in North Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s as well as the little known but heated leadership debates in 1950 and 1978 about whether China should commit forces to support communist allies facing existential threats. But perhaps just as significant were two PRC decisions not to send combat troops abroad (see below).

In the latter half of 1950, Beijing weighed the difficult decision of whether to dispatch troops to Korea. Commencing with the outbreak of the Korean War in June, Beijing kept a wary eye on the peninsula especially after U.S. intervention. Preparations for the invasion of Taiwan were put on hold as troops were relocated from coastal provinces across the strait to northeast China adjacent to Korea. Battlefield reverses following the success of U.S. amphibious landings at Inchon behind the lines of the North Korean People’s Army in September saw U.S. columns ominously advancing northward across the 38th Parallel toward China. While Beijing eventually made the decision to dispatch combat troops to Korea, the debate among political and military leaders was heated and protracted, extending over many months. When the decision was finally made, it was not announced publicly, and the intervention force was formally labeled the “Chinese People’s Volunteers” to maintain the fiction that the PRC itself was not waging war in Korea against the United States. Although in retrospect it is tempting to conclude the decision was inevitable, a review of primary sources reveal the decision was not a foregone conclusion. Footnote 112 In any event, the PRC went on to employ hundreds of thousands of ground troops on the Korean Peninsula between 1950 and 1953; moreover, thousands of Chinese uniformed personnel subsequently remained in post-armistice North Korea until October 1958. Footnote 113

Fifteen years later, in 1965, Beijing again weighed a decision on military intervention – this time in Vietnam, following a request from Hanoi for massive Chinese security assistance to include combat forces. Beijing debated the matter and decided against sending combat troops. Instead, Beijing dispatched a Chinese People’s Volunteer Engineering Force (CPVEF) as well as divisions of anti-aircraft artillery each composed of tens of thousands of personnel. The deployment was low key and use of the descriptor “volunteers” allowed Beijing to claim China was not at war with the United States and South Vietnam. The CPVEF focused on building roads, railway tracks, bridges, and tunnels. In addition, Chinese engineers constructed telephone lines, communications facilities, numerous underground facilities as well as a large airbase for their North Vietnamese allies. Footnote 114 The anti-aircraft batteries, meanwhile, were deployed in the vicinity of Hanoi and north of the city rotating every six months. In all a total of 150,000 artillery personnel were stationed in North Vietnam between August 1965 and August 1970. Footnote 115

“No Go” Decisions

Notwithstanding the above employments, there are at least two episodes when Chinese leaders demurred from dispatching troops abroad. In 1950 Beijing had also weighed a decision to send armed forces into Vietnam. This time Beijing decided against dispatching troops even though the Viet Minh, waging an anti-colonial war in French Indochina, lobbied hard for all the military assistance they could get from the PRC. While Beijing was keen to assist, sending armed formations to French-occupied Vietnam appears not to have been a serious option. Instead, the very first dispatch of uniformed personnel beyond the PRC’s borders, in August 1950, was a 79-strong Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) of battle-tested PLA officers. Footnote 116 China’s noncombat contribution to the war against France nevertheless proved decisive: the CMAG provided valuable day-to-day operational and tactical advice to their Vietnamese brothers in arms as the PLA trained and equipped Viet Minh forces leading to victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Footnote 117

Then, in the late 1970s Beijing again debated whether to dispatch troops abroad, this time to Cambodia in support of a PRC ally facing an existential threat from Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge appealed for Chinese troops and the CCP Politburo vigorously debated the matter during a May 1978 session. According to one account of the meeting, Politburo member Geng Biao, a veteran soldier and experienced diplomat, argued that sending troops would violate the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Footnote 118 The body demurred from dispatching combat forces. But this did not appear to be the end of it as the “idea” was “debated on several occasions throughout 1978.” Footnote 119 Chinese troops were reportedly placed on standby in Nanning to be airlifted to Cambodia if the decision was made. Moreover, six months later, in November 1978, a high-level Chinese delegation paid a four-day factfinding mission to Phnom Penh to assess the situation. Footnote 120 In the end Beijing demurred from sending troops to Cambodia and instead decided to launch a “self-defense counterattack” directly against Vietnam in February 1979. Footnote 121 One of the goals of the operation was to ease the military pressure on Cambodia which in late December had been invaded by sizable Vietnamese forces.

Tentative Steps toward a Global Presence

The dispatch of PLA troops in blue helmets of the United Nations in 1990 was a watershed event since prior to this overseas deployment of PRC uniformed personnel was limited to China’s Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Beijing’s attitudes toward peacekeeping were colored by a desire to present a positive image to the world of China “making tangible contributions to global peace and stability.” Footnote 122 China’s participation in UNPKOs followed a cautious and incremental approach. The PRC began by joining the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in the mid-1980s. After considerable deliberation, Beijing decided that Chinese uniformed personnel should participate in peacekeeping. The relatively small-scale deployments of Chinese armed forces personnel for UNPKO duties in the 1990s were far from routine operations for China’s armed forces. These significant experiences contributed to a broader global mind-set within the PLA consistent with Hu Jintao’s New Historic Missions and the new concept of MOOTW. Over time China increased the number of personnel participating in UNPKOs: from a paltry 5 military observers detailed to the United National Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1990 in the Middle East to 2,521 on 8 different missions and at UN Headquarters by August 2020. Footnote 123 Another landmark 2015 event occurred when China sent its first combat infantry unit of 700 blue helmets to serve on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Footnote 124

Another landmark event was Beijing’s decision to participate in field exercises with the armed forces of other states. Commencing in 2002, PRC armed forces have routinely participated in field exercises with the militaries of other states both within China and overseas. The first one was a bilateral exercise with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002 conducted in a “border area.” Footnote 125 These exercises were institutionalized and continued, on a near annual basis, under the rubric of the SCO.

Then, since early 2009 the PLA Navy has deployed a three-vessel task force to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations on multi-month rotations. For the navies of many other countries, this mission would have been routine. However, for the PLA Navy such operations far from home were a daunting prospect, requiring considerable persuasion, and involving a steep learning curve. Footnote 126

By the early twenty-first century, when turmoil or civil war afflicted countries around the world, China was impacted. Billions of dollars of investments, equipment, and goods as well as tens of thousands of PRC citizens could be at risk. Under these circumstances Beijing set primary responsibility with employers – mostly state-owned enterprises – for the safety of their employees, although the MFA, through its diplomatic in-country missions, also had responsibility to protect PRC citizens overseas in harm’s way. Footnote 127 Hence, when civil unrest rocked the Solomon Islands in April 2006, the PRC Embassy in Papua New Guinea stepped up and chartered four commercial aircraft to evacuate more than three hundred Chinese citizens from the capital city of Honiara more than one thousand miles away. Footnote 128

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, PRC citizens in trouble abroad began to look to their armed forces for help. With decades of sustained military modernization, improvements in operational capabilities and the introduction of high-profile new air and naval platforms, such as aircraft carriers, Chinese people have heightened expectations for what the PLA should be able to do. Yet the gap between expectations and reality remains wide. China’s military was not trained, equipped, or postured to execute these operations. Moreover, the PLA was unable to project power great distances in the absence of overseas bases or extended out of area deployments.

In 2011, when Libya descended into chaos, the MFA scrambled to organize the evacuation of almost 36,000 citizens using almost exclusively chartered commercial ships and aircraft. Footnote 129 While the PLA played a role, it was largely peripheral and mostly symbolic. One PLA Navy frigate, the Xuzhou was diverted to the Mediterranean from operations in the Gulf of Aden to escort commercial vessels evacuating PRC nationals from Libya and four PLA Air Force IL-76 air transports conveyed Chinese civilians to Sudan from whence most were transferred to commercial charter aircraft for flights back to China. Footnote 130 According to two researchers: “Libya stretched the boundaries of China’s policy of non-interference, [and] … its evacuation from the country appeared to be a last resort … .” Footnote 131 According to Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Song Tao, the Libyan operation constituted: “the largest and the most complicated overseas evacuation ever conducted by the Chinese government.” Footnote 132 For soldiers and statesmen alike the experience was a pivotal one and they learned a central lesson from the experience: safeguarding China’s overseas interests required a fundamental reexamination of the PRC’s core principle of noninterference and a rethink of the strongly-held norm of not stationing or deploying its armed forces abroad for extended periods. Footnote 133

Four years later the PLA played the central and decisive operational role in evacuating several hundred PRC citizens from the chaos of the civil war in Yemen. This was possible because PLA Navy vessels were already in the region on counter-piracy duties. While the number of evacuees was far fewer than in Libya, China’s navy effectively conducted its first Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). Significantly, the PLA determined that NEOs had become an important mission requirement that demanded greater attention. The PLA Naval Command College took the unprecedented step of organizing two tabletop exercises with the UK’s Royal United Services Institution – one held in Nanjing in March 2016, and another held in London in March 2017. Footnote 134

The involvement of the PLA in high-profile overseas evacuation operations along with the box office success of films like Wolf Warrior II increased pressure on the military by raising popular expectations that the PLA would be able to rescue PRC citizens when they find themselves in harm’s way in distant trouble spots around the world. The 2017 action movie – the largest grossing domestically produced film in Chinese motion picture history – is set in a fictional war-torn African country with a Chinese Rambo-like hero and the PLA going above and beyond to rescue Chinese citizens. The film concludes with the following on screen declaration: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China. When you encounter danger in a foreign land, do not give up! Please remember, at your back stands a strong motherland.” Footnote 135 Coincidentally the release of the film occurred the same year that the PLA established its first official overseas base in Africa.

China’s armed forces will continue to have significant domestic obligations, combined with growing operational demands on the PRC’s periphery as well as heightened elite and popular anticipation that the armed forces will assume greater responsibilities in protecting China’s expanding array of overseas interests. The PLA has become an “overstretched military,” wary of being overcommitted, overextended, and pushed unwillingly toward a greater global role. Footnote 136

A PLA Command Culture of Close Control

The PLA’s command culture of close control has stubbornly resisted a Chinese global military posture. China’s bureaucracies are conservative, insular, and prioritize control over command. Hence, for the PLA it is appropriate to switch the conventional sequence of “command and control” to “control and command.” Footnote 137 This is certainly true of the bureaucratic cultures of national security and military structures in the PRC. Of course, this also tends to be characteristic of multiple bureaucracies in many countries, especially military ones. Nevertheless, Leninist systems such as the PRC are especially prone to such organizational pathologies where loyalty is prized and rewarded above performance and trust in subordinates is low. Footnote 138 This rigid top-down command culture has served as a barrier to distant overseas deployments.

The movement and positioning of military forces beyond the boundaries of the PRC continues to be far from routine although this has become more commonplace with uniformed personnel participating in UNPKOs around the world (since 1990) and Gulf of Aden anti-piracy task forces operations (since 2008). The deployment and stationing of units far from China raises sensitive command and control issues in a military command culture of close control. The pressure for change has been most discernible in naval operations because the PLA Navy in 2019 was not only charged “with strategic requirements for near seas defense … [but also] far seas protection.” Footnote 139 PLA Navy vessels have mostly operated in offshore waters and the Near Seas “where constant, real time communication with onshore superiors was the norm.” Footnote 140 Yet, when directed to execute missions at considerable distances from home, the PLA Navy has obeyed and its command culture has been forced to adapt or risk mission failure.

In the mid-2010s, under the auspices of Xi Jinping, the Chinese defense establishment initiated the most significant and sweeping organizational reforms in three decades. The goal was two-fold: to centralize and streamline command and control mechanisms as well as improve the ability of the armed forces to wage informatized warfare and conduct integrated joint operations beyond PRC borders. The vast and powerful general departments – including the GSD – were abolished and their successor entities incorporated into fifteen offices each reporting directly to the CMC. At the same time, seven military regions in existence since the 1980s were replaced by five theater commands. The outcome should mean fewer bureaucratic impediments to an expanded overseas posture.

Stressing or Transforming Command Culture?

China’s close control command culture impacts the way the PLA operates in two realms. First, in the realm of civil-military relations with the CCP penetrating deep into the military via multiple control mechanisms, including a political commissar system and Party committees. Footnote 141 A further underappreciated control mechanism is organic since virtually every leader in uniform is also a party member. The exercise of party influence in the armed forces is hence multidimensional. While this influence can work to strengthen unit cohesion and unity of command it can just as easily produce inertia and operational paralysis. Meanwhile at the apex of command party control and command over the PLA is exercised through the CMC. Yet this body is dominated by senior active-duty general officers. Indeed, the only civilian in the CMC in recent years is the chair Xi Jinping. Xi has sought to operate under the “CMC Chairman responsibility system” whereby he exerts strong personal control and command over the PLA. Footnote 142 Combined with the organizational reforms enacted on Xi’s watch, the outcome has been a remarkable centralization of control in the person of the CMC chairman.

A second realm in which the close control command culture impacts operations is intra-military whereby superiors tend to micro-manage subordinates. The combined effect of tight CCP institutional control and uniformed superiors’ control on PLA command culture has been to discourage operations much beyond the borders of the PRC, such as the military’s reluctance to deploy in the Gulf of Aden noted earlier. In recent decades, the service pioneering power projection missions far from home has been the PLA Navy. Existing PLA command culture has been strained as individual ships and naval task forces have adopted work arounds to be able to effectively function. Xi’s organizational streamlining has at once simplified and complicated control and command in the far seas. On the one hand, the chain of command now comes from the General Staff Department of the CMC through PLA Navy headquarters and bypasses the theater command level. Footnote 143 On the other hand, this increases the potential for greater micromanagement from the apex – the CMC. Footnote 144 A similar streamlined chain of command functions for Djibouti: from CMC to PLA Navy headquarters to the support base on the Red Sea. Footnote 145

PLA Navy deployments in the Indian Ocean have stretched the close control command culture almost to breaking point. According to two Chinese journalists, these “Far Seas deployments reveal problems such as complex command hierarchies” and put the “commanded from above’” model to the test. Footnote 146 An important lesson learned from these experiences, according to a staff officer with the East Sea Fleet was: “The lower the level of command, the stronger our commanding ability is, and the more we can adapt to the needs of the operations.” Footnote 147

The PLA command culture of close control has proved a barrier to Chinese global military activism because senior military leaders are uncomfortable with loosening the tight command and control structure. This inhibiting leadership mind-set perceives that the farther from home the deployment, the harder it is for headquarters to exercise control. Hence, the push for far seas deployments has not come from Navy brass. These distant deployments have stressed the rigid close control structure and PLA Navy vessels operating the Indian Ocean have in essence “exercised independent command.” Footnote 148

Conclusion

What explains the stark mismatch between China’s miniscule global defense posture and its vast economic presence and raised diplomatic profile? Why have seemingly highly ambitious rulers been extremely slow to deploy forces and build bases well beyond PRC borders? Domestic factors – geostrategic and normative – produced considerable aversion among Chinese political and military leaders. Among regime elites, a “nested” worldview prioritizing domestic security inhibited the embrace of a global military posture while an evolving national security lexicon signaled a gradual but growing elite realization of the need for a greater global military presence. Among PLA leaders, a “close-to-home” operational tradition and rigid command culture of close control proved deeply resistant to the development of a global military posture. Moreover, the prime overseas basing logic driving Chinese soldiers and statesmen for the foreseeable future will continue to be territorial defense with a secondary logic being overseas interests. Great power competition, while not totally absent, is likely to remain a distant third logic.

Now that Beijing has broken the decades-long PRC taboo against possessing distant overseas bases, additional bases seem all but inevitable in coming years. The choice of Djibouti was noncontroversial yet newsworthy internationally. But the next publicly declared military base is likely to be more controversial internationally and contentious within China. Despite the “breeching of an important psychological barrier,” Footnote 149 the selection of subsequent locations could be challenging because reaching agreement among multiple bureaucratic actors is likely to be more difficult than was the case with Djibouti, where a domestic consensus developed relatively quickly and easily. Hence, the PLA may opt for “places” rather than bases at least in the maritime realm.

The Future Trajectory of Beijing’s Overseas Basing

To date, Beijing’s global military posture has been sluggish with a “gradual and cautious” approach to overseas basing, especially outside of the Asia-Pacific region. Footnote 150 While new bases are likely to be established in far flung locales, these are likely to emerge slowly in coming decades. In the opinion of one PRC scholar: “China’s military footprint in the Middle East, albeit relatively weak compared with its economic presence, seems set to become more tangible in the years to come.” Footnote 151 What might a “more tangible” posture look like? According to this scholar: “China’s military footprint is non-traditional: it is soft and less visible; it does not … seek long-term geopolitical rivalry with other powers, but to protect its practical commercial interests and to project a positive image to the world.” Footnote 152 Indeed, China has “yet [to build] … up a global network of bases to massively project power abroad and to challenge or even attack the United States.” Footnote 153 Moreover, China has focused more on its own neighborhood, building bases on its periphery. Thus, “for the foreseeable future” on the wider world stage, the PRC is destined to remain “an economic heavyweight … a diplomatic … [middleweight], and … a military featherweight … .” Footnote 154

Stealth Basing Although China has yet to formally acknowledge any overseas base other than Djibouti, Beijing appears to have at least one other installation in the neighboring Central Asian state of Tajikistan. While the precise status of this base remains unclear, it seems to have been operating for three or four years with a garrison of PRC paramilitary troops administered in conjunction with the host country. Footnote 155 This installation has not been publicly acknowledged and Beijing has worked to keep it low profile. Yet even for Djibouti, China denied its existence until practically the very moment it eventually announced the base as fact. Footnote 156 Beijing practices “stealth basing,” preferring to keep installations unofficial and under the radar.

Although attention on future PRC overseas bases has focused upon naval facilities, there are good reasons to believe that Beijing is considering formally establishing one or more land bases. Moreover, if the PLA is serious about a future of “integrated joint operations,” Footnote 157 it is possible that one day the Red Sea installation could evolve from a naval base into “Joint Base Djibouti” and subsequent installations could be interservice. A prime candidate location of Beijing’s first official ground force base would be somewhere in Central Asia. The logics behind such a step are manifold: the region has great geostrategic importance for the PRC, holds considerable economic value, and is closely linked to China’s frontier defense and internal security. However, potential barriers, include Russian sensitivity to growing Chinese influence in a region that Moscow regards as its “near abroad,” as well as the possible reluctance of Central Asian states to embrace a larger Chinese footprint. While it is too soon to discern precisely what lessons the CCP and PLA have taken from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing is certainly studying closely Moscow’s experience. Footnote 158 One likely takeaway is that where Central Asia is concerned China must be prepared to assume a greater military role because Russia’s performance in Ukraine calls into serious question the competence and capabilities of Moscow’s military to deal with a contingency in this region. Footnote 159

Great Power Redux or Great Power Lite?

Overseas bases remain key elements of a great power’s global military posture. Although the demise of empires and advances in technology have obviated the need for numerous and sizable installations to sustain out of region or global presences, a twenty-first century great power requires at least a modest network of overseas bases or basing access. Footnote 160 Yet China has chosen a great power lite approach to global military posture, to include considerable use of overseas commercial port infrastructure. Footnote 161 According to one scholar, “China’s global military posture may not resemble the American variant. Beijing may lack alliance networks. It is more likely to opt for dual-use facilities, rotational access, and a lighter footprint – at least for now – when its military still faces difficulties in challenging the United States outside the Indo-Pacific.” Footnote 162

Of course, Beijing may have a secret plan. Yet, available evidence suggests that China does not have a comprehensive master plan or detailed global strategy for military presence or expansion. Indeed, Beijing seems to have no grandiose plan for global domination; rather, Beijing appears focused upon achieving domestic goals and resolving territorial disputes around China’s periphery. Footnote 163 Nevertheless, in coming years – absent some “exogenous shock” such as a great power war or state failure in a locale where Beijing has sizable stakes – China will likely continue to project and sustain a “soft military footprint” further afield as needed to safeguard expanding overseas interests. Footnote 164