Introduction
Recent developments in relations between the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China, such as formal visits and the release of new strategic documents, have demonstrated how much European attitudes have shifted during the leadership of Xi Jinping. A key turning point was the release of the European Commission’s EU-China – Strategic Outlook in 2019, in which China was defined in tripartite terms as a “partner” in dealing with transnational threats but also as an economic “competitor” and a “systemic rival”.1 This posture was reaffirmed in March 2022, when the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS) released its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, with the aim of providing EU member states with a plan of action to “to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider” by committing to a series of common objectives over the next 5–10 years.2 On the Chinese side, 2022 was marked by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which gave Xi Jinping a third mandate as General-Secretary.3 The following month, in a speech to the European Parliament, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell observed that the Party Congress had “largely confirmed what we already knew”, stating that the approach defined in the 2019 Strategic Outlook “has to be reaffirmed”, and “still remains valid”.4
While the EU has confirmed its intention to stick to the “tripartite” strategy in handling its relations with China, this has been received with a certain degree of public confusion by the Chinese leadership. It has been described by Wang Yi, State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, as suffering from “cognitive dissonance”, for example.5 An increasing impasse, hampering cooperation between the two parties, became apparent during the China-EU Summit, in April 2022. This was defined by Borrell as a “dialogue of the deaf” due to the inability of the two parties to hold a constructive conversation on the two most urgent points of the Summit: bilateral tensions between the EU and China and the war in Ukraine.6 This impasse inevitably affects cooperation on issues of mutual interest, something that has become particularly noticeable now that personal visits have become possible after almost three years in which the COVID pandemic prevented face-to-face contact. The first European leader to visit Beijing after the pandemic was the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, in November 2022. He was followed by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in December 2022, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, together with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in March 2023, and the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez, the same month.
The words of Wang Yi and Borrell, as well as recent remarks by von der Leyen and the texts of the EU’s strategic documents, are evidence that the EU and China are now approaching their mutual relationship through two different conceptual frameworks. This article investigates the roots of the shift in this relationship through an analysis of Chinese and EU policy documents and declarations made by business leaders during the period in which the EU’s assessment of China transitioned from “strategic partner”, as stated in the 2003 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,7 to “security concern”, the phrase adopted in 2019.8 It draws upon “relational theory” developed by the Chinese scholar Qin Yaqing9 to address the following questions: What are the reasons behind the paradigm-shift in the EU-China relationship? Is this change rooted in the renewed Chinese assertiveness characterising Xi Jinping’s leadership, or is it a function of more systemic changes? Why is it currently so difficult for the EU to find a functional framework to engage with China?
The article comprises three sections. Firstly, by adopting Qin’s relational perspective, it will shed light on how the two parties began to reconceptualise their own, and their counterpart’s, identities and roles on the international stage. Secondly, the article will explore the ways that a new “securitised” European discourse on China translated into concrete security moves and assess the likely impact that these moves will have in the future. Finally, it also addresses the limits of the EU’s current “tripartite” strategy towards China. While this formulation demonstrates an attempt to encapsulate the complexity in the relationship, it contains difficulties in balancing and reconciling the strategy’s three different “fronts’. The case of Chancellor Scholz’s visit to China will be used as an example. Thirdly, considering that China’s positioning on the conflict in Ukraine has been described as a “determining factor” for the future of EU-China relations by von der Leyen, the article will investigate the potential “mismatch” in expectations about China’s behaviour regarding the conflict and assess the consequences of this discrepancy.10
Overall, the article will argue that the critical factor affecting the shift in EU-China relations is the “rise” (or “re-emergence”) of a non-Western actor, one with a different economic model and set of values, that is fundamentally changing the architecture of global power. While China’s diplomatic assertiveness during Xi Jinping’s presidency is often seen as the crucial factor triggering the shift in EU-China relations, this article suggests that this change is more structural. Following the 2008 ‘Global Financial Crisis’ (GFC), the Chinese leadership came to understand that the Western capitalist economic model was not invincible and that, with its own “rise”, China could claim a right to an autonomous role on the international stage, following its own model of development. Ultimately, the article concludes that the EU’s “tripartite” strategy towards China, while acknowledging the complexity of the EU-China relationship, seriously limits any long-term, pragmatic framework of engagement with China, resulting in mutual misunderstanding between the two parties.
The relational factor in perceiving China’s “re-emergence”: from “strategic partner” to “security threat”
What kind of issues does China’s “rise” (or “re-emergence”) pose for the EU? During the 1990s and early 2000s, while being aware of important divergences on issues such as human rights, EU institutions regarded China’s economic growth as an opportunity, and China as a central “partner”.11 In particular, “China’s re-emergence” was openly described as “a welcome phenomenon”.12 In the 2013 EU-China Agenda for Strategic Cooperation, the two sides talked hopefully of “enhancing dialogue and coordination at bilateral, regional and global levels, to meet regional and global challenges together”.13 During the 2010s, however, there was a change of posture by both parties, noticeable in official documents released by the European Commission and also in the academic literature. From the EU’s perspective, it appeared to be gaining little from its security engagement with China, resulting in a difficulty in balancing security concerns with economic engagement. China’s “re-emergence” as a global power started to be characterised with an additional layer of complexity. New “realist” concepts such as the “Thucydides trap” started to be applied to relations between China and Western powers,14 and a new narrative of a “China threat” emerged.15 Prominent Western and Chinese scholars, such as David Shambaugh and Chen Zhimin, who had previously held more optimistic beliefs on the relationship, started to highlight its “growing uneasiness”16 and “complicated” nature.17 Tensions in the relationship were exacerbated by the growing anxiety in US-China relations and aggravated by questions relating to human rights, especially the treatment of the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region.
The motivations underlying this shift in the relationship were complex, encapsulating both “material” factors, such as the crucial issue of access to each other’s markets, and ideological factors. By mid-2021, European institutions were willing to describe some of China’s global activities, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as posing “serious threats to rules-based multilateralism and core democratic values”.18 This view on China’s “rise” was also evident at the European Council Summit in October 2022, where EU foreign ministers endorsed an advisory note written by the EEAS, which confirmed previous concerns about the potential security threats posed by the growing global presence of China and exhorted EU states to “prevent and isolate China's attempts to apply its divide et impera tactics” and to “refrain from isolated or uncoordinated initiatives that would weaken our stance”.19
The EU’s relationship with China is still strongly based upon values-based paradigms, as evidenced by tensions regarding human rights issues. This overlaps with material factors through concerns that China’s global initiatives embody a different set of norms and standards. In particular, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been described by EU parliamentarians as a “threat” to “core democratic values”.20 This ideational dimension has a crucial role in the development of EU-China relations and goes hand in hand with the “material” dimension of the relationship. This is especially relevant considering the centrality that new “non-traditional” transnational threats, such as climate change and pandemics, play in the way the EU perceives other states and shapes its relations with them. It is important to consider that the EU and China may understand these concepts in different ways, because of their own identities and value sets, and therefore hold different normative stances on issues that are sensitive and crucial to both parties. As this paper will analyse, ideational factors have to be considered as connected with more “material” factors when examining the shift in EU-China relations because they often have practical consequences. One example, which this article will explore, is the freezing of the Comprehensive Agreement of Investment (CAI) between the two.
There is little doubt that China under Xi Jinping is more influential on the global stage than it has ever been. However, this article argues that Xi’s ascent to General-Secretary is not the only element underlying the shift, and that a constellation of factors has changed China’s and the EU’s perceptions of “self” and “other” in the relationship. While Xi’s leadership has played a part in affirming China’s global role, the ethos underlying his tenure, asserting China’s independent role as a world power following its own model of development, preceded his elevation to the head of the Communist Party. For the Chinese leadership, the 2008 GFC proved that the Western capitalistic model of development was not infallible, and that Western countries did not necessarily have a more successful ideal to “teach”. Instead, China could follow its own development model and, if successful, even export it to third countries through strategies that do not rely on Western standards, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. This is evidenced both by Chinese official declarations and by the debate in Chinese academic literature at the time. Soon after the start of the GFC, in his Political Report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, President Hu Jintao stated that “the international balance of power is changing” and argued that China's model was as valid as that of Western powers, and how China was ready to play its role on the international scenario, since “progress towards a multipolar world was irreversible”.21 This concept was further reinforced in Hu’s address to the 2008 G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy in Washington, where he asserted that “A comprehensive reform needs a general design which should […] also take into account the development stages and characteristics of different economies”.22 Hu also spoke about a more “active” role for China on the international stage when meeting the US President, George W. Bush, before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in 2008. At the time, news media described it as a “a potentially ambitious role for his country in staving off a deep global recession”.23 In the decade following the GFC, this “ambitious role” became normalised.
Chna’s growing economic power led to a change in China’s self-perception and a simultaneous shift in its perception towards Western countries, economically weaker after the GFC. This was reflected in the memoirs of the former State Councillor Dai Bingguo, one of the most prominent figures during the tenure of Hu Jintao. In 2008, he noted that “the United States had fallen into the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s; at the same time, China’s economy continued to maintain strong growth”.24 On the occasion of his 11th Ambassadorial Conference Address in 2009, Hu Jintao stressed how, with the financial crisis, there had been “a major change in the balance of international power” (国际力量对比), and that “China’s development must inevitably influence the comparison of international forces”.25 Subsequently, other events have reinforced this change in perception. One example is Brexit, which has deeply affected the Chinese view of the EU’s cohesion. This is reflected in the work of several Chinese scholars, who, despite recognising the relevance of the EU as an economic actor on the global stage, now describe the EU as less integrated and weakened.26
Chinese analyses
This shift in perceptions can also be detected in the work of leading Chinese scholars. In 2009, Mei Zhaorong, a former Chinese ambassador to Germany and a former president of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, asserted that “we Chinese gradually realize that we have overestimated and been too optimistic about the EU and its attitude towards China; there are many “bubbles” in there in terms of economics”.27 In 2012, Jing Men, a leading Chinese scholar working on EU-China relations, who had previously expressed positive and optimistic views on an EU-China partnership, chose to refer to it as a “mismatched partnership”.28 The same year, Pan Chengxin, another key Chinese International Relations (IR) academic, criticised European expectations that China’s economic liberalisation would be followed by political liberalisation as unrealistic and leading to mutual misunderstandings.29 In 2013, Yan Xuetong, one of the most famous scholars in Chinese IR, highlighted this shift in power and perception by stating that “in the past we had to keep a low profile because we were weak while other states were strong […] Now, with “Striving for Achievement,” we are indicating to neighbouring countries that we are strong and you are weak. This is a change at a very fundamental level”.30
As an analysis of relevant policy documents and secondary literature shows, China’s perception of the EU, and more generally of Western powers, underwent a dramatic change after the 2008 GFC. Its self-perception also changed, both as a result of this and of the increasing economic and geopolitical weight that China obtained during the period and since.31 This has changed the posture that China has adopted in its relationships with Western counterparts, including the EU, which appeared to be further weakened by Brexit and the migration crisis. At the same time as Western states’ sense of self began to fragment, China gained confidence. Wang Huning, one of the most powerful contemporary Chinese political theorists and a member of the CPC’s Politburo Standing Committee, had previously analysed this divided sense of self in his book “America against America” in 1991. There he expressed admiration for American society but, at the same time, he observed that Western societies lacked a sense of collective identity. China’s self-perception, he argued, reflects a very strong sense of self and of what it means for China to pursue its own successful path of development.32 Considering identities, and the way they change over time and relate to each other, is therefore key to understand the causes lying at the root of the change in EU-China relations. This article argues that the role of states’ self-identities cannot be overlooked when considering the development of the EU-China relationship.
This concept is exemplified by the Chinese scholar Qin Yaqing’s theory of “relational identity”, which explains how “the identity of an actor is formed and reformed through relations with other actors in society”.33 One actor’s interaction with another actively shapes their perception both of their “self” and of the counterpart. This normative and ideological dimension is prominent in crucial EU and Chinese policy documents and cannot be disregarded. While the Realist body of International Relations literature does not necessarily encompass this dimension, different scholars in Western literature have also developed theories attempting to encapsulate the role of norms and identities when exploring relations between actors on the international stage, especially within the Constructivist strand of literature. However, this article specifically sets out to include a Chinese perspective when exploring the limitations of the current EU strategy towards China. This is because it argues that the root of the current tensions and the impasse in communication lies in a change in reciprocal perceptions of “self” and “other”, due to a change of the balance of power in the relationship. Drawing upon a Chinese conceptual approach is particularly helpful, since Western theories are often unable to properly describe China’s strategic thinking and foreign policy behaviour, and the key aspect of what has become known as the “Chinese School” is exactly to overcome this issue and encapsulate Chinese perspectives and traditional thinking.
Together with Yan Xuetong’s moral realism and Zhao Tingyan’s Tianxia system, Qin Yaqing’s relational theory of world politics is one of the most representative and influential ideas emanating from the Chinese School. Similar to Yan Xuetong and Zhao Tingyang, Qin Yaqing advocates incorporating ancient Chinese political thought into the study of international relations. Qin’s earlier works were heavily influenced by Social Constructivism and his approach builds upon Alexander Wendt’s “Constructivism”, conceptualising identity as a defining interest. He goes beyond this notion, however, and conceives of relations as the “prime mover” of behaviour. Identities are intrinsically linked to relations and social roles are therefore determined by social relations. Qin Yaqing highlights the significance of relationality, known as guanxi (关系) in Chinese society, a concept rooted in Confucianism. Decision-making in Chinese tradition is based on factors such as intimacy and hierarchical status within a relational context since Chinese society is characterised by a web of relations. Qin argues that, unlike the current Western worldview, which is more focused on the individual, Chinese society perceives and comprehends the world through a relational lens, and that this inevitably affects the Chinese way of looking at international relations and the Chinese perception of China’s role in the world. Qin’s relational theory was officially presented in 2015, focusing on the concept of “relationality” as a core element.34
Qin’s theory is an excellent tool for understanding the causes of the current state of EU-China relations, which started to shift after 2016 with the release of A New EU Strategy on China35 by the European Commission, and matured into the 2019 Strategic Outlook, where China was addressed as a “systemic rival” for the first time. This was demonstrated by several moves towards greater securitisation on the EU side and a significant increase in diplomatic tensions. However, as demonstrated by the analysis of relevant policy documents and official declarations, this change actually has much deeper origins. While China has certainly become much more diplomatically assertive under Xi, this shift in perception precedes Xi’s tenure and appears to be rooted in a “relational” shift, in which perceptions of both “self” and “other” in the relationship changed. Following Qin, this article highlights the ways that the actors’ changing perceptions of themselves, and of their counterpart, played an important role in determining their actions in the relationship. Adopting this ontology of relations, it analyses how relations between the EU and China contributed to creating new perceptions of their own identities and motivated their actions towards each other. This conceptual approach is employed to investigate the process through which China passed from being considered an economic “partner” to being perceived as a “security threat”, the way this has been translated into action through concrete tools and how this is likely to affect the future of the relationship.
Having begun by investigating the shift in European and Chinese relevant policy documents and secondary literature, this article will further explore how this change in perceptions evolved into an impasse in the relationship and then into a conciliating re-engagement with security concerns by examining the cases of the CAI and of Chancellor Scholz’s visit to China in November 2022. Scholz’s official visit was the first by a European leader to China after the pandemic and it was surrounded by particular criticism due to acquisition of shares in the Tollerort terminal of the Port of Hamburg by a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) COSCO. It is therefore an ideal case to show the difficulties in finding a balance between the different parts of the current EU “tripartite” strategy towards China. Finally, it is worth exploring the effect of China’s position regarding the conflict in Ukraine on its relationship with the EU, considering the different normative and ideational positions of the two parties. This analysis highlights the pragmatic limits of the current EU approach towards China in conciliating new tensions with inevitable re-engagement.
The EU side, from security discourse to securitisation: managing the dependency on China and the Chinese reaction
In this section I examine how the shift in the relationship and the subsequent security discourse on China has translated into moves by the EU towards securitisation. In order to concretely understand the paradigm-shift in the relationship, and for the purpose of effectively analysing how the relationship will develop, it is crucial to address one of the priorities that the EU has set for its relations with China. This is the more effective management of, and a reduction in, the EU’s economic dependency on China. The European desire to re-engage with China coexists with an awareness of the complications that characterise current EU-China relations, especially in terms of economic security. While the implementation of policy tools to rebalance distortions in its single market are important and necessary for the EU, these measures also have implications for Chinese actors. They will certainly affect the future of EU-China economic relations, which sit at the cornerstone of the EU-China relationship.
These EU tools include the foreign investment screening mechanism, which came into force in October 2020 with the aim of giving the Union a means to identify, evaluate and mitigate the potential risks arising from foreign direct investment (FDI), and also the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR).36 The latter was approved by the European Council in November 2022 and aims to mitigate distortions of the European single market by non-EU actors. The measure establishes a series of procedural rules to examine the impact of state subsidies. From September 2023, companies involved in the implementation of “concentrations’ (mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures) in which one of the parties has a global turnover exceeding 500 million euros, or is involved in procurement procedures exceeding 250 million euros, will have to inform the European Commission regarding “financial contributions” received from non-EU governments, exceeding certain relatively low thresholds.37 The measure aims to restore fair competition between companies operating in the European market. It is important to underline that this is the first instrument at a European level aimed at controlling significant subsidies from third parties in this way. In a case where the Commission finds that a subsidy from non-EU actors constitutes a market distortion, it will carry out a balancing test. In the event that it finds a market distortion, the Commission will be able to examine foreign subsidies up to five years before the entry into force of the measure, taking action to mitigate any distortions. This aspect of the measure is particularly important since it allows the Commission to act in cases where the cumulative investments over the years by a non-EU actor create distortions on the market.
Chinese SOEs are identified as one of the main players whose investments can create distortions to competition within the European market and therefore as one of the main targets of the new measure on foreign subsidies.38 A potential example is COSCO, a giant in the shipping industry, which has made significant investments in recent years in several EU countries. As an SOE, COSCO receives Chinese state funds, so the competition with other companies is arguably not on an equal level. Furthermore, the fact that Chinese SOEs already control 10% of Europe's container seaborne capacity, poses risks in the medium to long term.39 In June 2023, COSCO completed the acquisition of almost 25% of shares in the Tollerort terminal of the Port of Hamburg from Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA), adding to its existing stakes in many other EU ports. These include 67% of Piraeus in Greece,40 49% of Noatum Port (which manages the container terminals of Valencia and Bilbao in Spain),41 40% of Vado Ligure in Italy,42 and 35% of Rotterdam in the Netherlands.43
The Chinese reaction to the introduction of the FSR demonstrates the limits of the current EU “tripartite” strategy. While Chinese experts recognise the mutual tensions in the relationship and the reasons behind the EU’s increasing securitisation moves, these have affected, and will continue to affect, the perception of main Chinese economic actors who discern a lack of coherence between the different aspects of the current EU strategy. China’s Chamber of Commerce in the EU (CCEU) has communicated its “deep concerns” over the FSR implementation44 and, in its response to the Commission, stated that the FSR would impose “disproportionate burdens” on Chinese companies and would “unjustifiably impede legitimate business activities”, and that its implementation would be “potentially discriminatory”.45 This dispute reveals the conceptual gap in the two sides’ understandings of their relationship. From the European perspective, the implementation of economic security tools is compatible with effective economic engagement. From the perspective of the CCEU, the implementation of the EU's securitisation tools would cause “trade barriers” and be unjustifiable and discriminatory.46
The text of the CCEU Report demonstrates a new self-perception of China as an equally powerful actor calling for “mutual respect and equality” as necessary for “deepening practical and open cooperation in fields of economy, trade, transportation, innovation and climate action, and properly manage differences”.47 Drawing upon Qin Yaqing’s relational theory, we can say a shift in the relationship has occurred: a change in the way the two actors perceive themselves and their counterpart, with a change in the balance of power in favour of China. On this basis, the CCEU describes the EU’s securitising tools as partial and “ambiguous”. Its document instead advocates “mutual trust”, which is identified as a system which also benefits Chinese interests. For example, in regard to cybersecurity, a particularly sensitive field, the report calls for “a mutual recognition mechanism” with expectations that “the two sides develop a set of mutually recognised testing standards” (p. 137). Moreover, while the securitisation measures are presented by the EU as necessary for mitigating the distortions on the single market, the CCCEU report alludes to “prejudices” that need to be “put aside” and “political inclinations” which “shouldn’t affect [the EU’s] regulation of its market” (p. 185). Once again, it demonstrates how the different aspects of the EU's “tripartite” strategy may be reconcilable for the EU, but not for its Chinese counterparts. This conceptual difference results in a reciprocal lack of trust, as evidenced by the words of Cui Hongjian, Director of the Department of European Studies at the China Institute of International Studies (a research institute directly administered by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), who was interviewed on the implementation of the EU’s FSR and described it as “a tool to restrict other economies and ensure [the EU’s] industrial advantages”. Similarly, the Chinese Mission to the EU criticised this tool for “set[ting] up trade barriers on the grounds of subsidies” and, in contrast with the EU’s belief in the coexistence of securitisation and economic cooperation, the Chinese Mission viewed it as going against “a good business environment for the operation of foreign-funded enterprises”.48
Another tool that the EU intends to use to ensure the economic security of member states, and one that has also been recognised as a factor that will affect the relationship with China, is the new Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). While the EU originally drew up the instrument in response to moves by the United States during the Trump administration, the use of this tool became associated with the response to economic coercion implemented by China against Lithuania.49 The tool prioritises dialogue to end economically-coercive actions, but it also provides for the use of “countermeasures” as a last resort. The ACI is therefore one of the measures that could have the greatest impact on EU-China relations and make re-engagement with China difficult. On the Chinese side, reactions to the introduction of the ACI have confirmed that the implementation of the Instrument will affect EU-China relations. From the CCEU Report on the Development of Chinese Enterprises in the EU in 2022 it is regarded as “pos[ing] sanction risks to Chinese enterprises” (p. 74).
Although China is not specifically mentioned as target of the EU’s securitisation tools, their timing does not appear to be coincidental. Instead, development of the tools testifies to the change in perception in the two sides’ relationship. The current “tripartite” strategy tries to construct China as simultaneously a “rival”, a “partner” and a “competitor”. As the Chinese reaction demonstrates, however, these new securitisation measures will affect EU-China relations broadly and, together with the “de-risking” approach outlined by von der Leyen in March 2023, they will probably be received as a symptom of “systemic rivalry” and “competition” on the Chinese side, further aggravating the already difficult attempt to re-engage with China.
The limits of reconciling “re-engagement” with “systemic rivalry”
The growing tensions in EU-China relations, as evidenced by recent events and policy initiatives, have created new obstacles to reconciliation and re-engagement. This has resulted in an impasse in the relationship and an inability to constructively discuss common interests, as exemplified by the discussions at the 2022 EU-China Summit. However, while increasing tensions in the relationship have translated into a growing securitisation of the EU discourse about China, re-engagement with China after three years of pandemic-related closure remains an EU priority. One significant long-standing problem in the relationship is that of reciprocal market access, a topic that the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, addressed during his official visit to China in late 2022. While the EU has always been a prime destination for Chinese investment, European FDI flows into China have encountered numerous barriers to accessing the Chinese market, such as significant investment restrictions, especially in sectors with high growth opportunities. FDI flows from the EU to China remain relatively small compared to the size and potential of the Chinese economy.50
A significant attempt to bridge this gap was made with the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), intended to give European investors greater access to the Chinese market, including through rules aimed at regulating the forced transfer of European technologies to China, the conduct of Chinese SOEs, as well as “comprehensive transparency rules for subsidies and commitments related to sustainable development”.51 After seven years of negotiations, the EU and China concluded the CAI negotiations in principle on 30th December 2020. The EU managed to achieve a significant number of the objectives that had been set regarding reciprocity in investment between China and the EU. However, ratification of the agreement was frozen by the European Parliament after China imposed sanctions on several of its members, a move that followed the EU’s imposition of sanctions on certain Chinese officials alleged to have been involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang.52 Despite a recent request by China’s new Ambassador to the EU, Fu Cong, for both parties to lift sanctions in order to “unfreeze” the CAI, this is very unlikely to happen.53 Europe’s earlier “mercantilist” approach towards China, personified by the previous German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has gone. The CAI is an important example of the difficulties of balancing the three aspects of the EU’s “tripartite” strategy towards China: it is not always possible to treat a counterpart as a “systemic rival” on the ideological level and then expect smooth economic cooperation.
Qin Yaqing’s relational theory is helpful to understand Chinese perspectives on the “freezing” of the CAI. This is demonstrated by the words of Fu Cong, the Chinese Ambassador to the EU, who identified the EU’s value-based paradigm towards China as the main difficulty in “unfreezing” the agreement. In an interview with the Global Times, he noted that “people in Europe are reluctant to lift sanctions on China due to ideological bias”.54 Differences in the two actors’ perceptions of “self” and “other” emerge, specifically in terms of consequences of China’s behaviour in regard to human rights abuses. Fu Cong highlighted how “we told the EU that, first of all, many of [the EU’s] perceptions on China's so-called human rights issues are based on misunderstanding and prejudice, which is unreasonable in itself. On this basis, [the EU] has imposed sanctions on us”, making it clear that the role of human rights in determining the future of the relationship is very different among the two parties. For the EU, China’s human rights abuses are a fundamental factor determining the future of the relationship, demonstrating once again that the EU still uses a strongly value-based approach in its strategy towards China. For China, conduct in regard to human rights does not play a role in determining economic cooperation. Ambassador Fu Cong expressed this openly, by stating: “I often say to the EU that if you have to wait until all the political and human rights differences between China and the EU are resolved before you develop economic and trade relations with China, when will that be? Therefore, we call on the EU to take a more rational attitude. There are other channels to discuss human rights concerns, and there is no need to link them with economic and trade issues”. From this conceptual gap, an impasse is born, since Chinese actors regard their perspective as valid as that of the EU and call for “solutions” that are only acceptable if “based on equality and mutual benefit”.55
Once again, the difficulty in balancing the “systemic rivalry” with economic engagement emerges. This is also openly reflected in the CCCEU 2022 Report where, in referring to the second meeting of the European Union and United States’ Trade and Technology Council (TTC), it highlighted how, in the CCCEU’s perspective, identifying China as a “systemic rival” “would cause spillover effects in more areas and would be closely followed with a negative impact”.56 The issue of balancing different aspects of the strategy also emerged during Chancellor Scholz’s visit to Beijing in November 2022, the first official visit by a European and G7 leader to China since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic nearly three years earlier. The purpose of the chancellor’s visit was mainly to seek greater opening of the Chinese market and to deepen economic cooperation: the chancellor was accompanied by a delegation of German industry leaders including executives of companies such as BASF, Bayer and Volkswagen. Scholz's visit provided a demonstration of how attempts to re-engage with China are limited by other aspects of the “tripartite” European strategy towards China. While some positive outcomes were obtained, some more problematic aspects emerged, particularly concerns about Germany increasing its economic dependence on China. These surfaced following the agreement with COSCO on the acquisition of shares in the Tollerort terminal of the Port of Hamburg from Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA), a subsidiary of the federal administrative body of the German city.
The current complexity of the EU-China relationship demonstrates the limitations of actually implementing and balancing the three aspects of the “tripartite” strategy. While the strategy makes sense for the EU, because it is coherent with European norms and sense of identity, it is perceived differently on the Chinese side. Despite recent visits, it will be difficult to pursue re-engagement with China while holding significant concerns and expectations on both the ideological level and that of economic security. Ideally, the necessary introduction of the EU’s security toolkit aims to securitise those aspects of the relationship that have become particularly sensitive or problematic, whilst continuing to cooperate in areas of mutual interest and benefit. However, these securitisation moves, together with tensions on ideational issues, have also impacted the perception of relevant Chinese economic actors in their relations with the EU.
The risk of a “mismatch” in expectations over China’s position on the conflict in Ukraine and the implications for EU-China relations
During a speech at the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) (co-hosted by the European Policy Centre) at the end of March 2023, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged the shift in the EU-China relationship, mentioning that relations “have become more distant and more difficult in the last few years”.57 She argued that China’s “increasingly assertive actions” and ambitions, as well as ideological differences, triggered this change. Yet, in the same speech, she expressed the need to re-engage with China after the pandemic. A major point of concern was certainly China’s posture on the conflict in Ukraine, especially following a visit to Moscow by Xi Jinping earlier in the month. von der Leyen was clear in asserting that “how China continues to interact with Putin's war will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward”. The EU has clear and quite specific expectations from China’s behaviour, which are once again rooted in European norms, identities and values. This is understandable. However, it is also important to consider the extent to which these expectations on China’s behaviour are realistic, considering that China’s set of norms and its way to handle its relations with its partners present profound differences from that of European countries.
Certainly, the publication by the Chinese government of its “Global Security Initiative” and its “12-point proposal” on the war in Ukraine, demonstrate its determination to play a more dynamic diplomatic role.58 However, as evidenced by the vague tone of the “12-point proposal”, the way in which China expects to contribute to the resolution of the conflict differs from the expectations of Western countries. It appears, for now, that China does not want to assume the role of mediator. This was confirmed by the emphasis on economic relations between China and Russia during Xi's visit to Moscow. These economic relations are now clearly in favour of China and could be used as leverage to advance political demands which, among other things, may also include priority issues for China that go beyond the conflict in Ukraine, such as gaining support for China's growing presence in the Arctic. Expectations of China taking up an active role as a mediator in a conflict in which it does not regard itself as being directly involved are quite unrealistic, especially if Western actors expect China to unreservedly espouse the European approach and position.
During her speech at MERICS, von der Leyen argued that Xi’s declared “no-limits friendship” with Vladimir Putin is incompatible with the way China should operate as a permanent member of the Security Council, bearing the “responsibility to play a constructive role in advancing a just peace” and she made clear that “peace can only be just if it is based on upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine”.59 A more realistic perspective suggests, however, that China will independently decide its own terms in managing its relationship with Russia. For now, China maintains what it regards as a “balanced” position between its relationship with Russia and its interest in promoting peace in a conflict that China has defined as “European” and in which it would gladly avoid involvement. China has made clear that it does not support the war and has expressed support for the restoration of “peace in Eurasia”. It has been unusually diplomatically active on the issue by publishing its “12 points’, with President Xi making a visit to Moscow and holding a phone call with President Zelensky of Ukraine, and sending a Chinese delegation to Ukraine, led by Li Hui, its “Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs’. However, it is not realistic to expect that China will follow a posture that perfectly reflects the EU’s expectations. The role that China will play will be calibrated on Chinese terms serving Chinese interests, rather than on European terms for European interests. China’s interests in determining the development of its relationship with Russia go beyond the conflict in Ukraine and include, for example, seeking support for its increasing presence in the Arctic. Therefore, taking a stronger stance on the conflict or attempting to act as a mediator within it do not work in favour of the pursuit of China’s overall economic and strategic priorities.
The EU’s expectations of China’s positioning over the conflict in Ukraine understandably reflect the EU’s values, norms, and identities. On the other hand, China feels it has the right to handle its relationship with Russia on its own terms, in a way that is convenient for China and that does not necessarily need to reflect Western expectations and values. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has responsibilities to honour the values expressed in the UN Charter. However, the EU should not expect China to handle these responsibilities in ways that necessarily adhere to European expectations. Once again, the fact that China’s reaction to the Russian aggression of Ukraine plays such an important role in determining the future of the EU-China relationship poses a problem on the relational level. This impasse appears to exemplify Qin Yaqing’s ideas of two actors’ changing perceptions of “self” and “other”. China’s perception of “self” has changed as China has become more powerful on the international stage and it is not surprising that, in regard to the conflict in Ukraine, China chooses to maintain what it calls a “balanced” position that prioritises its own strategic interests. It is important to have a realistic picture of what the EU can expect from China in this situation and concentrate on what it is still possible to handle in the relationship. Since both parties hold firm positions, this is more likely to be the management of issues that are important for both parties within a pragmatic framework, with the aim of avoiding the most catastrophic scenarios, rather than trying to square a perfect solution.
Conclusions
The mutual misunderstanding at the root of the paradigm shift in EU-China relations has been described in many ways – as a “mismatch”,60 as a “conceptual gap”61, and as “cognitive dissonance”62 but all these expressions highlight an ideological and normative difference underpinned by changing perceptions of “self” and “other”. In other words, they appear to fit Qin Yaqing’s model. As China becomes more powerful in both economics and geopolitics, these changing perceptions are being translated into new misunderstandings and tensions. China’s own self-perception, as a more powerful and confident actor, and of the EU as a less powerful actor translates into new ways of acting. On the other hand, the EU continues to hold expectations towards China that reflect European values, norms, and identities. The EU’s attempt to balance its relationship with China through a much stronger partnership with the US has also been a major factor affecting the shift in the relationship. In this sense, major power competition has certainly affected the EU’s conceptualisation of, and strategic thinking towards, China.
The EU’s current “tripartite” strategy towards China, which is strongly based on EU’s norms and identities, has been received with confusion by the Chinese side, causing the present impasse in the relationship. Specifically, reconciling the seemingly contrasting aspects of the strategy seems to be particularly hard, as demonstrated by Wang Yi, when he said, “it is hard to imagine that on one hand, Europe seeks to build a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, and on the other hand, it defines China as a systemic rival”.63 To avoid this confusion and ambiguity, the EU might, instead, try to find a better balance between the different aspects of the current strategy and thereby develop a pragmatic framework in which to operate with China. This would allow the two sides to cooperate in dealing with transnational threats such as climate change and potential future pandemics while acknowledging their substantial differences. As this article has demonstrated, different identities, as well as different sets of values and norms, have played a major role in affecting the two actors’ perspectives and behaviours. This lack of mutual understanding on the normative and values level has resulted in a less cooperative model of engagement and in an impasse in the communication process.
What emerges is a conceptual gap at the core of EU-China relations and in the way the two sides perceive each other, themselves and their roles in a new global order. This inevitably affects the way the two interact and define their engagement. The EU is finding it problematic to balance between pursuing its interests with China while, at the same time, expecting China to cooperate in a framework which is strongly based on European norms and identities. For China, the awareness of having become a global power has led it to become more assertive in wanting to operate on its own terms, rather than adapting to European expectations. While this change has become particularly evident during the leadership of Xi Jinping, the political ethos underlying his tenure has deeper roots. China started maturing a new perception of its global role before Xi became CPC General-Secretary. Notably, the 2008 financial crisis provided a lesson in the fallibility of the Western model of development and showed to China that it could thrive following its own path. Xi Jinping, with growing diplomatic assertiveness, has made clear that China does not want to be a “taker” of Western norms but a global power with an active role in shaping the norms of the international system. This includes managing China’s relations with other actors on Chinese terms and in a way that is opportune for China. It is this change that has created the “mismatch” in the expectations the EU holds concerning China’s behaviour regarding the conflict in Ukraine.
The EU is working towards a re-engagement with China, especially now that face-to-face meetings have resumed, and recent visits to Beijing demonstrate this. However, re-engagement with China will ultimately be moderated and limited by the critical issues currently characterising EU-China relations. The EU’s growing securitisation moves towards China highlight how the use of tools and measures intended to protect the EU’s economic security will also affect Chinese businesses accessing the single European market, and this will play a significant role in the development of future EU-China relations. As became clear during Chancellor Scholz’s visit to China, it is now increasingly difficult for EU leaders to pursue their relationship with China in a mercantilist way, only on the basis of mutual economic interests, because questions of values and security inevitably emerge. Finding a better balance between the different aspects of the EU's “tripartite” approach will be necessary in order to navigate the current ambiguity stemming from the EU’s approach, and to pursue a fruitful dialogue with China as well as to defend the EU’s strategic interests. In order to do so, it is necessary for both parties to clarify the role of their relationship in a changing world order. Ultimately, despite the issues posed by major power competition and an EU’s strong partnership with the US, the model of engagement with China must be functional to safeguard mutual interests and enable fruitful communication in order to tackle transnational issues, such as climate change or pandemics.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Alice Politi
Alice Politi is a PhD Candidate at King's College London. Her doctoral research focuses on EU-People's Republic of China relations. She is also the recipient of the 2024 PhD Eisenhower Fellowship and will be an incoming Fellow at the NATO Defense College. Email: alice.politi@kcl.ac.uk
Notes
1 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council and the Council, ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’, March 12, 2019, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf (accessed 20 March 2023).
2 European Union External Action Service, ‘A Strategic Compass for the EU’, Brussels, March 20, 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-eu-0_en (accessed 20 March 2023).
3 Chinese name: 中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会 (Zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng dì èrshí cì quánguó datibiǎo dàhuì).
4 European Union External Action Service, ‘China: Speech by High-Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EP debate on EU-China relations’. Press release by EEAS Press Team, November 22, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/422872_fr (accessed 20 March 2023).
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Gives Interview to Xinhua News Agency and China Media Group on International Situation and China’s Diplomacy in 2021’. Press release, December 30, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/202112/t20211230_10477324.html (accessed 20 March 2023).
6 European Union External Action Service, ‘EU-China Summit: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EP plenary’. Press release by EEAS Press Team, April 6, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-summit-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-ep-plenary_en (accessed 20 March 2023).
7 European Commission policy paper ‘A maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations’, September 10, 2003, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_03_1231 (accessed 21 March 2023).
8 European Commission, Joint Communication to the Council and European Parliament, The European Council and the Council, ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’, March 12, 2019, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf (Accessed 20 March 2023).
9 Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 122. doi:10.1017/9781316869505
10 European Commission, ‘Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre’, March 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063 (accessed 21 March 2023).
11 European Commission policy paper, ‘A maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations’, September 10, 2003, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_03_1231 (accessed 21 March 2023).]
12 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “EU – China: Closer partners, Growing Responsibilities” 24 October 2006, p. 12. https://eur-lex.europa.eu//legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A52006DC0631 (accessed 30 March 2023).
13 Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, ‘EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’, November 23, 2013, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu-china-2020-strategic-agenda-cooperation_en?s=166.
14 Graham Allison, ‘Thucydides’s Trap has Been Sprung in the Pacific’. Financial Times, August 21, 2017.
15 Emma V. Broomfield, ‘Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat Theory’. Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 12. Issue 35 (2003): 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056022000054605 (accessed 30 March 2023).
16 Chen Zhimin, ‘Europe as a Global Player: A View from China’. Perspectives Vol. 20. Issue 2 (2012).
17 David Shambaugh, ‘China-Europe Relations get Complicated’. Brookings East Asia Commentary, May 1, 2007.
18 European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy, ‘A new EU-China strategy’, September 16, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021IP0382 (accessed 30 March 2023).
19 European Council, Council Conclusions, October 20–21, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2022/10/20-21/ (accessed 30 March 2023). Finbarr Bermingham, ‘China Relations Slide Down Crisis-Hit Agenda for EU Leaders Summit’. South China Morning Post, October 20, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3196578/china-relations-slide-down-crisis-hit-agenda-eu-leaders-summit (accessed 30 March 2023).
20 European Parliament Resolution of 16 September 2021 on a New EU-China strategy, ‘A New EU-China strategy’, September 16, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021IP0382 (accessed 30 March 2023).
21 Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, ‘Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress’, September 30, 2011, https://www.cscc.it/upload/doc/full_text_of_hu_jintaos_report_at_17th_party_congress___qiushi_journal.pdf (accessed 17 June 2023).
22 The Office of the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Lithuania, ‘Hu Jintao Addresses the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy in Washington’, November 16, 2008, http://lt.china-office.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/200811/t20081118_2691896.htm (accessed 17 June 2023).
23 Chris Buckley and Terry Wade, ‘Hu signals ambitious China role in fighting crisis’. REUTERS, November 22, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-36639020081122 (accessed 20 June 2023).
24 Dai Bingguo, ‘Strategic Dialogue - Dai Bingguo memoirs(Chinese Edition)’, People's Publishing House, 2009. https://www.abebooks.com/Strategic-Dialogue-Dai-Bingguo-memoirsChinese-Edition/18983533890/bd.
25 Doshi, Rush, ‘“A Change in the Balance of Power”: The Financial Crisis and the Dawn of Building,’ in The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. New York: Oxford Academic, 2021, online edn. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197527917.003.0008 (accessed 23 June 2023).
26 B. Zhang and Q. Li, ‘China’s perception of the European Union during Brexit: the case of Chinese scholars.’ Comparative European Politics Vol. 21 (2023): 631–648. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00356-2.
27 Mei Zhaorong, ‘A Further Understanding of China-Europe Relations’. Ouzhou Yanjiu [Chinese Journal of European Studies] Issue 5 (2009): 12–22.
28 Jing Men, ‘The EU and China: mismatched partners?’ Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 21. Issue 74 (2012): 333–349.
29 Pan Chengxin, ‘Problematizing ‘Constructive Engagement’ in EU-China Policy’, in Roland Vogt (Eds.), Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals?. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012.
30 Yan Xuetong, ‘From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement’. The Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 7. Issue 2 (2014): 153–184. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615905 (accessed 25 June 2023).
31 John Simpson, ‘Successes and failures: Hu Jintao's legacy’. BBC, July 20, 2012, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18897490 (accessed 5 April 2023).
32 Huning Wang, America Against America. Independently published, 1991. Available at https://ia801806.us.archive.org/12/items/america-against-america/America%20Against%20America.pdf (accessed 21 November 2023).
33 Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 122. doi:10.1017/9781316869505.
34 Hwang Yih-Jye, ‘Reappraising the Chinese School of International Relations: A Postcolonial Perspective’. Review of International Studies Vol. 47. Issue 3 (2021): 311–330. doi:10.1017/S0260210521000152. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/reappraising-the-chinese-school-of-international-relations-a-postcolonial-perspective/8035C0A9D7A73A130CB902145A19E487.
35 European Commission, ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’, June 22, 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52016JC0030.
36 European Commission, ‘Investment screening’, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/investment-screening_en (accessed 5 April 2023).
37 European Commission, ‘Foreign Subsidies Regulation: rules to ensure fair and open EU markets enter into force’, January 12, 2023, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/foreign-subsidies-regulation_en (accessed 5 April 2023). European Council, ‘Council gives final approval to tackling distortive foreign subsidies on the internal market’, Press release, November 28, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/28/council-gives-final-approval-to-tackling-distortive-foreign-subsidies-on-the-internal-market/ (accessed 5 April 2023).
38 European Parliament News, ‘Parliament wants to clamp down on foreign public subsidies’, November 8, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/world/20221103STO48001/parliament-wants-to-clamp-down-on-foreign-public-subsidies (accessed 4 April 2023).
39 Elvire Fabry and Jacopo M. D’Andria, ‘The Challenges of Chinese Investment Control in Europe’. Jacques Delors Institute, February 11, 2019, https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/TheChallengesofChineseInvestmentControlinEurope-FabrydAndria-Feb19.pdf (accessed 4 April 2023).
40 Kaki Bali, ‘In Greece's largest port of Piraeus, China is the boss’. DW, October 30, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/greece-in-the-port-of-piraeus-china-is-the-boss/a-63581221#:~:text=Piraeus%20is%20not%20Hamburg,was%20later%20increased%20to%2067%25 (accessed 4 April 2023).
41 COSCO Shipping, ‘COSCO SHIPPING Acquired 51% shares in Noatum Port Holdings in Spain’, COSCO Shipping Group News, June 13, 2017, https://en.coscoshipping.com/art/2017/6/13/art_6923_59856.html (accessed 4 April 2023).
42 Official Website of the Ports of Genoa Vado Gateway - APM Terminals Vado Ligure S.P.A, https://www.portsofgenoa.com/it/porti/porti-vl/porti-apm-vl.html (accessed 4 April 2023).
43 COSCO Shipping, ‘COSCO Pacific Limited entered into a Share Sale and Purchase Agreement with Hutchison Port Holdings Limited for the acquisition of equity interest in Euromax Terminal Rotterdam’, COSCO Shipping Group News, https://ports.coscoshipping.com/en/Media/PressReleases/content.php?id=20160513 (accessed 4 April 2023).
44 China Chamber of Commerce to the EU, ‘CCCEU expresses deep concerns over draft implementing rules for EU's foreign subsidies regulation’, March 9, 2023, http://en.ccceu.eu/2023-03/09/c_2900.htm (accessed 7 July 2023).
45 European Commission, ‘Feedback from: China Chamber of Commerce to the EU (CCCEU) – on Distortive foreign subsidies – procedural rules for assessing them’, March 6, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13602-Distortive-foreign-subsidies-procedural-rules-for-assessing-them/F3387403_en (accessed 10 July 2023).
46 Global Times Staff Report, ‘Chinese companies concerned about EU's Foreign Subsidies Regulation’, March 8, 2023, http://www.aecf-france.org/2022_CCCEU_Report_on_the_Development_of_Chinese_Enterpriese_in_the_EU_en.pdf (accessed 7 July 2023).
47 CCCEU Report on the Development of Chinese Enterprises in the EU in 2022, p. 36 (accessed 7 July 2023).
48 Global Times Staff Report, ‘Chinese companies concerned about EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation’, March 8, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1286935.shtml (accessed 21 November 2023).
49 European Parliament News, ‘MEPs back new trade instrument to protect the EU from economic blackmail’, October 10, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221010IPR42635/meps-back-new-trade-instrument-to-protect-the-eu-from-economic-blackmail (accessed 6 April 2023).
50 Thilo Hanemann and Mikko Houtari, ‘EU-China FDI: Working towards more reciprocity in investment relations’. MERICS, April 17, 2018, https://merics.org/en/report/eu-china-fdi-working-towards-more-reciprocity-investment-relations (accessed 6 April 2023).
51 European Commission, ‘Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment’, December 30, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pt/IP_20_2542 (accessed 6 April 2023).
52 European Parliament News, ‘MEPs refuse any agreement with China whilst sanctions are in place’. May 20, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210517IPR04123/meps-refuse-any-agreement-with-china-whilst-sanctions-are-in-place (accessed 6 April 2023).
53 Ji Siqi, ‘China-EU relations: lift sanctions together to free CAI investment deal, Chinese envoy urges bloc’. South China Morning Post, February 11, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3209879/china-eu-relations-lift-sanctions-together-free-cai-investment-deal-chinese-envoy-urges-bloc (accessed 6 April 2023).
54 Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, ‘Ambassador Fu Cong’s Exclusive Interview with Global Times’, March 3, 2023, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/mh/202303/t20230303_11035695.htm (accessed 12 July 2023).
55 Hailey Wong, ‘China Envoy Renews Call to Revive Stalled CAI Trade Pact with EU’. South China Morning Post, March 30, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3215251/china-envoy-renews-call-revive-stalled-cai-trade-pact-eu (accessed 27 July 2023).
56 CCCEU Report on the Development of Chinese Enterprises in the EU in 2022, p. 77.
57 European Commission, ‘Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre’. March 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063 (accessed 21 March 2023).
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper’. February 21, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html (accessed 9 April 2023).
59 European Commission, ‘Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre’. March 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063 (accessed 21 March 2023).
60 François Godement and Abigaël Vasselier, ‘China at the gates: a new power audit of EU-China relations’. European Council on Foreign Relations. December 1, 2017, https://ecfr.eu/publication/china_eu_power_audit7242/ (accessed 15 April 2023).
61 Pan Zhongqi, Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations. Global Governance, Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.
62 David Shaumbaugh, ‘China Eyes Europe in the World. Real Convergence or Cognitive Dissonance?’, in David Shaumbaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong (Eds.), China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects. London: Routdlege, 2008.
63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Gives Interview to Xinhua News Agency and China Media Group on International Situation and China’s Diplomacy in 2021’, December 30, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/202112/t20211230_10477324.html (accessed 20 March 2023).